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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Targeted sanctions are an important, and at times, effective tool of the UN Security 
Council. Whether they are employed to try to change behavior, constrain proscribed 
activities, or send a powerful signal, they play a central role in UN efforts to maintain 
international peace and security. Targeted sanctions are currently used to counter 
terrorism, consolidate the implementation of peace agreements, defend human rights 
norms, pursue investigations, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. All UN sanctions today are targeted sanctions. Following the severe 
humanitarian consequences of comprehensive sanctions directed against Iraq during the 
1990s, the UN has adopted only targeted measures. The UN currently has 11 targeted 
sanctions regimes in place, with more than 1000 designations worldwide (1015). Most 
targeted sanctions (628 of 1015 or about 62%) entail sanctions against individuals 
designated by the UN Security Council. 
 
Yet, the very instrument of targeted sanctions is under significant and growing challenge 
today. National and regional courts have increasingly found fault with the procedures 
used for making designations of sanctions on individuals and entities, as well as with the 
adequacy of procedures for challenging designations.1 Human rights advocates have been 
outspoken in their criticisms of the measures, contending that the prevailing UN 
procedures for making designations violate fundamental norms of due process. National 
legislative and parliamentary assemblies have begun to question the authority of their 
executive officials to implement UN targeted sanctions without their consent. As a result, 
a number of Member States have found themselves in the difficult position of being 
forced to choose between contravening the rulings of their domestic courts and decisions 
of their legislative bodies on the one hand, and their obligations to implement binding 
Chapter VII decisions of the UN Security Council, on the other. 
  
Although the most potent challenges are coming from the courts, the issue is not 
exclusively a legal one. There is a real, and growing, political problem associated with 
the legitimacy, not only of the instrument of targeted sanctions, but increasingly of 
actions taken under Chapter VII by the UN Security Council itself. This is a fundamental 
challenge to an essential instrument of the international community to counter threats to 
international peace and security.  
 
There is no inherent contradiction between the defense of fundamental human rights and 
the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN Charter accords primacy to 
both goals in Article 1, where it states the fundamental purposes of the organization. US 
President Barack Obama used his 2009 inaugural address to state explicitly “we reject as 
false the choice between our safety and our ideals”2 The Eminent Jurists Panel on 
Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights came to a similar conclusion in its 
                                                 
1 See reports of the Monitoring Team of the 1267 Committee (the Al Qaida and Taliban Sanctions 
Committee) for lists of litigation, and Appendices A and B for information on legal challenges.  
2 http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/
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February 2009 report, acknowledging the necessity of countering terrorism, but pointing 
out the need to do so by maintaining human rights standards. A broad international 
consensus on this point already exists, as manifested by the UN General Assembly’s 
Global Counter-Terrorism strategy which calls upon all Member States not only to 
undertake measures to counter terrorism, but to do so “in accordance with the Charter of 
the UN and the relevant provisions of international law, including international standards 
of human rights.”3
 
Yet more often than not, the issue of UN targeted sanctions designations continues to be 
framed by both policy practitioners and external observers in terms of a trade-off between 
security and human rights. It is time to move beyond this conceptualization, and this 
report is intended to facilitate that process with regard to targeted sanctions. This is a 
difficult, but not an insoluble problem, as security and human rights can be seen as 
mutually reinforcing. It is important to address this issue proactively, because a further 
erosion and diminution of Security Council legitimacy to address critical problems of 
terrorism and proliferation could have highly undesirable consequences. Every option 
should therefore be on the table for consideration. 
 
In 2006, we co-authored a report titled “Strengthening Targeted Sanctions through Fair 
and Clear Procedures.”4 The drafting of the report, subsequently known as the “Watson 
Report,” was supported by the governments of Switzerland, Sweden, and Germany and 
was later issued as a UN document of both the Security Council and the General 
Assembly in June 2006. We made a number of reform recommendations in the 2006 
report, reflective of the debate underway and ideas in circulation in New York and 
national capitals worldwide at the time. We recommended improvements to four 
principal aspects of due process: to the processes of notification, access, fair hearing, and 
effective remedy.  
 
The Security Council’s procedures have undergone significant reform to improve the 
fairness and transparency of the regime since 2006, and this update will identify and 
analyze these measures. It is important to recognize the important changes already made 
and to give credit to the serious and painstaking efforts to address the problems. 
Nonetheless, legal challenges in national and regional courts, concerns in parliamentary 
assemblies, and criticism from the human rights community continue. The political 
problem has only grown worse, with criticism expanding beyond measures to counter 
terrorism to criticism of targeted sanctions in general.  Should the current trajectory of 
court challenges continue without adequate response, the Security Council’s ability to 
take action against threats to international peace and security could be severely 
compromised.   
 
                                                 
3 Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly, Measures to eliminate international terrorism, 
A/RES/63/129, Distr. 15 January 2009.  Available at: http://www.un.org/ga/63/resolutions.shtml
4 Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear Procedures (“Watson Report”), March 2006, 
available online at http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf, The report 
was made an official document of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, UN Doc. 
A/60/887-S/2006/331. 
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With the support of a Swiss academic consortium – UNO Academia5 – this report has 
been drafted to contribute to the ongoing debate about how to maintain international 
peace and security without jeopardizing fundamental human rights. We present a full 
array of options – from incremental changes to the UNSCR 1822 review procedure 
currently underway, to measures taken at the national and regional level, and finally to 
proposals for the creation of a review mechanism at the UN Security Council level. We 
will weigh the pros and cons of the different options in an effort both to anticipate, and to 
advance, the debate. 
 
The report is divided into six sections. The first provides background and a brief 
overview of the problem. The second describes the many improvements already made to 
the process of designations and review procedures at the UN level (with an emphasis on 
changes made since 2006). Prepared by our legal colleagues, Larissa van den Herik and 
Nico Schrijver the third section discusses challenges to targeted sanctions presented by 
recent litigation. The fourth evaluates the extent to which the reforms to date have 
addressed the problems of notification, access, fair hearing, and effective remedy. Section 
five presents a range of options for further reform, including a preliminary assessment of 
the pros and cons of each, in the spirit of contributing to the ongoing debate about the 
issue.  The final section includes recommendations advanced by the authors to address 
the current human rights challenges to targeted sanctions. 
 
 
SECTION ONE – BACKGROUND  
 
When targeted sanctions were first introduced in the early 1990s, the rights of individuals 
targeted – typically sovereign heads of state and/or their key political supporters – were 
not considered. Autocratic political leaders violating international norms by supporting 
acts of terrorism or overthrowing democratically elected leaders were generally not the 
subject of widespread sympathy. As long as the state sponsoring the resolution met the 
political standard of obtaining a veto-proof minimum number of nine votes on the 
Security Council, most Member States did not contemplate the potential violation of 
individual rights. As one member of the UN Secretariat observed a decade after targeted 
sanctions were first introduced, “the issue of individual human rights was not thought 
through at the outset.”6
 
Indeed, it has been the widespread application of targeted sanctions in support of counter-
terrorism measures since 2001 that has raised the most questions about their potential 
violation of individual human rights. The UN Security Council passed UNSCR 1267 in 
October of 1999, a measure designed to put pressure on the Taliban regime to hand over 
Usama bin Laden for the attacks on two US embassies in East Africa in August of 1998. 
The resolution was unusual in the sense that it named an individual in the text of the 
resolution, Usama bin Laden, even though he was technically not initially the target of 
the sanctions.  
                                                 
5 Information about UNO Academia is available at http://www.unoacademia.ch/. 
6 Senior official of the UN Secretariat, speaking at a training workshop on the design of targeted sanctions 
organized for members of the UN Security Council, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown 
University, May 2003. 
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It was not the application to bin Laden that has subsequently proven controversial, 
however, but the widespread extension of the asset freeze and travel ban to individuals 
designated as financial supporters of al Qaeda immediately following the attacks of 11 
September 2001. At the time, the global outpouring of sympathy for the US was such that 
there was little scrutiny given to the proposed additions. The names the US proposed 
were added to the list. Even if the designation was based on classified intelligence not 
made available to the other members of the Council, as was the case with many of the US 
designations during this period, there was little or no questioning or opposition.  
 
The relative lack of scrutiny in this extraordinary period (from late 2001 through the first 
half of 2002), laid the basis for many, though not all, of the legal challenges that have 
subsequently emerged, challenging the implementation of Security Council targeted 
sanctions by individual Member States.  
 
By far, the largest number of designations has been made by the Al Qaida and Taliban 
Sanctions Committee (the 1267 Committee) which as of 23 October 2009 had 504 
individual and entities designated – 397 individuals (255 associated with Al Qaida and 
142 associated with the Taliban) and 107 entities associated with al Qaida. The issue is 
not restricted to the activities of the 1267 Committee, however. A majority of the cases 
handled by the UN Secretariat’s focal point (created pursuant to UNSCR 1730 and 
discussed more fully below) has dealt with challenges to the implementation of the 
sanctions against individuals designated by the Liberia and DRC sanctions committees. 
 
Targeted sanctions are principally intended to be political and preventive measures, rather 
than punitive ones. Inclusion on the list is not a legal determination, but rather a political 
finding of association with al Qaeda and the Taliban. The designations are also intended 
to be temporary, at least in theory. As such, they do not require the evidentiary standards 
associated with legal prosecutions. Nonetheless, the open-ended nature of their 
application by UN sanctions committees, combined with the potential violation of 
elements of due process in their application to individuals, have led to legal challenges 
about their punitive nature. 
 
Legal challenges 
 
More than thirty legal challenges to UN Security Council targeted sanctions listings have 
been pursued in courts worldwide – in Europe, the US, Pakistan, Canada, and Turkey – 
over designations made either by the UN’s 1267 Committee or in the context of the 
implementation of UNSCR 1373 (see Appendices A and B). Some of the cases have been 
dropped, after individuals were delisted by the 1267 Committee. Sixteen cases (involving 
15 separate individuals or entities) are currently pending or remain under appeal.  
 
The most highly visible and significant decision to date was made by the highest court in 
the European Union, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which decided in favor of two 
legal challenges on 3 September 2008 and annulled the European Union regulation 
implementing UNSCR 1267 with specific reference to the two cases. In its judgments in 
the cases of Kadi and Al Barakaat (joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P), the Court 
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distinguished between the imposition of the sanctions by the 1267 Committee and the 
implementation of the sanctions at the EU level, holding that the latter are bound by 
fundamental rights when implementing the sanctions, and that therefore they must ensure 
that the persons affected have the right to be informed of the reasons for their listing and 
the right to contest those reasons before an independent body.  The European Court of 
Justice granted a delay of three months during which time the EU Council was to remedy 
the shortcomings of the listing mechanism, or the EU Regulation implementing the UN 
listing would become null and void. 
 
The Court specifically charged that “the rights of the defence, in particular the right to be 
heard, and the right to effective judicial review of those rights, were patently not 
respected.”7 The EU subsequently applied the procedures it typically employs for EU 
autonomous sanctions, informing the two plaintiffs of the reasons for their designation 
and giving them an opportunity to respond. Following this procedure (and within the 
three month deadline established by the ECJ), the EU Commission decided to re-instate 
the designations of both Kadi and Al Barakaat. There was serious concern at the time, 
however that if Europe set a precedent by selectively implementing decisions taken by 
the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it would pave the 
way for other national and regional bodies to do the same, undermining the ability of the 
international community to impose and implement targeted measures with consistency 
across different jurisdictions.  
 
In the Kadi case, as well as several others, human rights lawyers have charged that the 
implementation of UN targeted sanctions against individuals may violate the fundamental 
human rights of those individuals, as protected not only by the European Convention on 
Human Rights, but also by other regional or global conventions.8 More specifically, they 
assert that rights to property, freedom of movement, a fair hearing, and effective judicial 
review are denied by the current use of the UN targeted sanctions instrument.  
 
Because of the visibility, significance, and venue of the Kadi and Al Barakaat cases, 
many have characterized the legal challenges as “a European problem.” The problem is 
not uniquely a European one, however. As discussed in more detail in Appendix B, 
depending on precisely how one counts them, more than one-third of the legal challenges 
to the 1267 listing regime globally have been lodged outside of European courts. Cases 
directly challenging 1267 designations have been taken before national courts in the US, 
Pakistan, Turkey, and before the UN Human Rights Council. There have also been legal 
challenges, not to the 1267 designation per se, but to related decisions by governments to 
order deportation, impose house arrest, or prevent return to country of origin, of 1267 
designees in Canada and Pakistan (see details in Appendices A and B). Courts have also 
increasingly begun to accept cases challenging national or regional autonomous 
designations associated with the implementation of UNSCR 1373.  
 
                                                 
7 European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, 
Press Release No. 60/08, 3 September 2008, p. 2. 
8 Iain Cameron, “UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards, and the ECHR,” Nordic Journal of 
International Law (2003): 1-56. 
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In terms of the outcome of court decisions to date, challenges to the competence and 
authority of the UN Security Council to make such designations have not succeeded. 
Rather, it is national or regional implementation of UNSC measures that have been the 
subject of court rulings. Although the sample is small, relatively more successful 
challenges have focused on due process concerns, on the proportionality of sanctions, or 
the denial of fundamental rights to property and freedom of movement. The most visible 
legal challenges stem from designations made in 2001 and 2002 (i.e. Kadi, Al Barakaat, 
the Al Haramain Foundation, and Nada), but legal challenges to designations have also 
come from more recent designations. The cases brought by Abd al-Rahman al-Faqih and 
Tahir Nasuf both stem from designations first made in 2006. The celebrated alphabet case 
in the UK also derives from recent designations of five individuals, as does the case of 
Hafiz Saeed in Pakistan. This suggests that the issue of legal challenges to targeted 
sanctions against individuals is not going to go away until it is dealt with by some of the 
policy reform options outlined in Section Four.  
 
Legal challenges, particularly those that have international visibility and resonance such 
as the Kadi case, can have detrimental effects far beyond the counter terrorism regime. 
Their symbolic significance should not be underestimated, and their resonance in public 
opinion can do extensive damage both to the instrument of targeted sanctions and to the 
reputation of the UN Security Council. The total number of legal challenges to date does 
not do justice to this phenomenon, as the number of court cases is relatively small. 
 
A growing political problem for targeted sanctions 
 
The issue has gone beyond legal challenges and is now spilling over into parliamentary 
debates and motions to limit Member States’ ability to implement UN sanctions under 
certain conditions. In Switzerland, a motion has been unanimously adopted by the upper 
chamber that would require the Federal Council, as of the beginning of next year (2010), 
to cease implementing sanctions against individuals included on the 1267 Consolidated 
List in cases where the individual: (1) has been on the list for more than 3 years and not 
been brought before the court, (2) has not had the possibility to resort to an independent 
institution for a remedy, (3) has had no indictment issued, and (4) has not had new 
incriminating evidence brought forward since listing.9  The second house of Parliament is 
expected to discuss the motion in December.  In the first case considered by the UK’s 
new Supreme Court, the litigants have raised questions about the authority of the UK 
government to implement UN targeted sanctions against individuals without  
Parliamentary approval via primary legislation.10 Finally, in the Netherlands, a 
Commission of State has been installed on 8 July 2009 to advise the Government on the 
need to amend the Dutch Constitution on a number of issues, including the influence of 
                                                 
9 Motion 09.3719 Submitted to the Council of States by Dick Marty (Liberal Party) 12 June 2009 and 
passed unanimously in the Upper Chamber, 8 September 2009. To become law, this requires acceptance by 
the National Council (Lower Chamber), which is expected to take up the motion by the end of 2009. 
10Afua Hirsch, “State and the individual – supreme court takes on weighty first case” The Guardian, 5 
October 2009. In the case of A, K, M, Q & G, the UK High Court of Justice held that Parliament had to be 
involved in the implementation process of the 1267 sanctions regimes.  See High Court of Justice, A, K, M, 
Q & G and H.M. Treasury, [2007] EWHC 869 (Admin), 24 April 2008. 
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the international legal order on the Dutch legal order.11 In the process leading up to the 
installation of the Commission, the Netherlands Council of State explicitly referred to the 
1267 regime as an example of international rules that were drafted outside a proper rule 
of law context.12
 
In addition to the parliamentary challenges, the general perception of unfairness in the 
application of targeted sanctions has generated public opposition and the formation of 
support groups for selected designees on the 1267 list in Sweden and Saudi Arabia. 
Officials of the New Zealand government faced political embarrassment and public 
criticism over its authorization of a travel ban and asset freeze on the wrong individual. 
The application of targeted sanctions has been derided in Germany, where a data 
protection NGO bestowed the dubious honor of the 2008 Big Brother Award on the EU 
Council for its application of targeted sanctions to counter terrorism. Some UN Member 
States have indicated a growing reluctance to add names to the lists of individuals and 
entities targeted by Security Council sanctions because of these concerns, and more than 
50 Member States have expressed concern about the lack of due process and absence of 
transparency associated with listing and delisting. 
 
In February 2009, the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human 
Rights, issued its report, “Assessing Damage, Urging Action.”13  While acknowledging 
that the freezing of assets of those involved in terrorism “is clearly an acceptable and 
indeed necessary tactic in effectively combating terrorism,” it strongly criticized the 
listing system as “unworthy” of international institutions like the UN and EU. Other 
groups such as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on 
Human Rights likewise have issued reports critical of the UN sanctions process for 
inadequate procedures for delisting.14
 
The consequences of not having thought through the targeting of sanctions against 
individuals are beginning to return to challenge the very legitimacy of the targeted 
sanctions instrument. This has spilled over into other aspects of UN operations. Members 
of the UN Secretariat staff responsible for assisting with sanctions implementation have 
occasionally felt estranged from their colleagues in other divisions (DPKO or OCHA), 
who indicate that they want to maintain their distance from the sanctions issue. 
 
The legal issues and human rights concerns are significant, but need to be placed in a 
broader political context. Virtually all of the major legal challenges to date have stemmed 
                                                 
11 Staatscourant 10354, 9 July 2009. 
12 Advice Council of State, 14 April 2008, Parliamentary Records II 2007/08, 31 570, nr 3,  para. 4.2.3. 
13 Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, International Commission of 
Jurists. 16 February 2009, Geneva. 113-117, available online at 
http://ejp.icj.org/hearing2.php3?id_article=167&lang=en
14 Résolution 1597 (2008) Listes noires du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et de l’Union européenne 
Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, available online at 
http://assembly.coe.int/mainf.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta08/fres1597.htm
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from designations associated with efforts to counter terrorism, not those associated with 
the enforcement of peace agreements, human rights violations, or nuclear proliferation. 
Global terrorism has been characterized by the UN Security Council as a threat to 
international peace and security, and targeted sanctions have been imposed on individuals 
and entities as both preventive and deterrent measures to counter that threat. The growing 
negative reaction to targeted sanctions for counter terrorism purposes, however, risks the 
further erosion of the credibility and future utility of the instrument of multilateral 
sanctions in general.   
 
 
SECTION TWO – DEVELOPMENTS AND PROCEDURAL IMPROVEMENTS  
 
In the more than three and one-half years since the Watson report, significant changes 
have transpired in procedures of UN sanctions committees, as well as related political 
developments. This section provides a summary of the major developments since March 
2006.15
 
As noted in the original Watson report, the movement for reform within the UN has been 
building for years. In December 2004, the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change appointed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted:  
 
“The way entities or individuals are added to the terrorist list maintained by the 
Council and the absence of review or appeal for those listed raise serious 
accountability issues and possibly violate fundamental human rights norms and 
conventions.”16
 
Subsequently, the General Assembly in its September 2005 World Summit Outcome 
document called on the Security Council “to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist 
for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and removing them, as well as for 
granting humanitarian exceptions.”17
In response, the Secretary-General directed the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) to begin an 
interdepartmental process within the UN to develop proposals and guidelines to address 
such concerns.  OLA commissioned Professor Bardo Fassbender of Humboldt University 
in Berlin to conduct a study.  His March 2006 report argued that the Security Council 
must strive to balance its principal duty of maintaining international peace and security 
                                                 
15 This section discusses the most prominent initiatives since 2006, but does not include all of the reports 
prepared on the subject.  See Appendix A for a discussion of legal developments, which are not addressed 
here. 
16 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World, Our Shared 
Responsibility, UN Document 1/59/656, para. 153, 2 December 2004 at: 
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf 
17 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 109, at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN021752.pdf 
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with respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of targeted individuals to the 
greatest extent possible.18  He articulated basic elements of fair and clear procedures.  
 
Based on the Fassbender analysis, Secretary General Annan in June 2006 conveyed to the 
Security Council an informal paper, “Targeted individual sanctions: fair and clear 
procedures for listing and delisting,” in which he enumerated basic elements to ensure 
fair and clear procedures. Accordingly, persons against whom measures have been taken 
by the Security Council have:  
 
- the right to be informed of those measures and to know the case against him or 
her as soon as, and to the extent, possible; 
- the right to be heard within a reasonable time by the relevant decision-making 
body (including ability to directly access the body possibly through a focal point, 
as well as a right to be assisted or represented by counsel); 
- right to review by an effective review mechanism (the effectiveness which 
depends on impartiality, degree of independence, and ability to provide effective 
remedy).19 
 
These elements, along with a regular review of targeted sanctions against individuals to 
mitigate risks of violating the right to property and related human rights, represent the 
first articulation by UN officials of minimum standards of procedural fairness. 
 
UNSCR 1730 –Establishment of Focal Point 
It is important to underscore that the Security Council has engaged in a continual process 
of self assessment and reform of its practices with regard to designations, exemptions, 
and delisting during the past three and a half years, as indeed it has since the first 
introduction of targeted sanctions in the early 1990s.  While the significance of these 
improvements tend to be minimized by some outside critics, the Security Council has 
demonstrated an ability to alter its practices regarding targeted sanctions, albeit in an 
episodic and reactive manner  
On 19 December 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1730 calling for the 
establishment within the Secretariat of a focal point to receive delisting requests.  
Proposed by France and supported by the US, UNSCR 1730 allows individuals to 
petition directly to the UN Secretariat for delisting.  The focal point receives requests 
                                                 
18Bardo Fassbender, “Targeted Sanctions and Due Process: The responsibility of the UN Security Council 
to ensure that fair and clear procedures are made available to individuals and entities targeted with sanction 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,” 20 March 2006, Study Commissioned by the United Nations Office 
of Legal Affairs, Office of Legal Counsel, 7-8, available online at 
http://www.un.org/law/counsel/Fassbender_study.pdf.  See also Bardo Fassbender,  Targeted Sanctions 
Imposed by the UN Security Council and Due Process Rights, 3 International Organization Law Review 
437, 449 (2006) 
19 Letter dated 15 June 2006 from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council, informal 
paper entitled, “Targeted individual sanctions: fair and clear procedures for listing and delisting”. 
Proceedings of 5474th Meeting, S/PV.5474, New York 22 June 2006.  Available online at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N06/400/28/PDF/N0640028.pdf?OpenElement
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from petitioners, acknowledges receipt and informs the petitioner on procedures for 
processing delisting requests, forwards the requests to the designating states and states of 
citizenship and residence, and informs the petitioner of the sanctions committee’s 
decision (as the focal point services all sanctions committees, not just 1267).   
Creation of the focal point, which became operational as of 27 March 2007, allows 
petitioners seeking delisting to submit requests to the Secretariat, in addition to their State 
of residence or citizenship.  Prior to the focal point, targeted parties generally could only 
access the UN system through their country of residence or nationality.20  The focal point 
represents an improvement in providing accessibility for those listed.  Security Council 
action did not, however, include authority for the focal point to handle exemption 
requests or provide for supplemental information and notification, as recommended in the 
original Watson report.    
Table I: Focal Point Statistics21
Focal Point Statistics  
Country - Committee:  
petitioner type 
Total number of 
individuals/entities 
requesting delisting 
through Focal 
Point22
Of these: 
petitioners 
pending with 
Focal Point 
Of these: 
petitioners 
delisted 
Of these: 
petitioners 
remaining 
listed 
AQ and T - 1267: individuals 11 1 4 6
AQ and T - 1267: entities 20 5 1423 1
Iraq - 1518: individuals 1 0 0 1
Iraq - 1518: entities 1 0 0 1
Liberia - 1521: individuals 16 0 5 11
Liberia - 1521: entities 9 0 0 9
DRC - 1533: individuals 3 1 1 1
DRC - 1533: entities 4 0 0 4
Subtotal individuals 31 2 10 19
Subtotal entities 34 5 14 15
Total 65 7 24 34
 
 
By all accounts, the focal point has functioned effectively, and there seems to be a 
consensus that the focal point could and should do more.  With the focal point’s 
responsibilities defined in UNSCR 1730, however, the Security Council should consider 
expanding its functions. Suggestions for additional administrative (not decision-making) 
                                                 
20 Owing to unique circumstances on the ground, the Liberia Committee’s procedures allowed delisting 
requests through the Permanent Missions of listed individuals’ nationality or through the nearest UN office, 
at least for a time.  
21 As of 26 October 2009.  Based on data available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/dfp.shtml and 
discussions with the Focal Point secretariat. 
22 Individuals and entities are only counted once. 
23 This figure also reflects the delisting of two entities and one individual through the 1822 Review process: 
their respective appeals were pending with the Focal Point when the 1822 Review decided to delist them. 
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responsibilities include: notifying targeted parties of their listing (in addition to states of 
residence and nationality) and serving as the entry point for exemption requests; 
permitting the focal point to provide general information regarding sanctions regimes and 
procedures to petitioners; and requirement for regular reports, including ideas for 
procedural enhancements.  In addition, the timeframe for responses to delisting requests 
could be shortened (from the current three months to one) and responses back to 
petitioners could be required to include reasons for maintaining them on the list.   
 
The Security Council should also consider enhancing the focal point’s tasks by requiring 
it to gather available information about the activities of those applying for delisting, such 
as information from national or regional legal cases for the 1822 review process.  This 
would assist the committee in developing a complete package for consideration of 
delisting petitions. 
 
UNSCR 1735 – Further Reform of 1267 Committee Procedures  
 
The Al Qaida / Taliban sanctions regime has demonstrated an impressive institutional 
development over the course of the past ten years.  What began as a vaguely crafted 
resolution imposing financial sanctions against the Taliban and extended to individuals 
“associated with” al Qaeda, UNSCR 1267 contained no provision for delisting when it 
was first introduced in 1999.  Today, it represents the most procedurally advanced of the 
sanctions committees with formalized procedures for delisting, a highly professional 
analytical staff (its Monitoring Team) issuing regular and detailed reports, elaborate and 
detailed procedures for designations on the basis of standardized statements of case, an 
ongoing internal review of all listings, routinized procedures for handling exemptions 
requests, and much greater transparency in its operations.  The periodic review of the 
1267 Monitoring Team’s mandate and resulting resolutions has become the vehicle 
through which many of the fair and clear procedural reforms are effectuated.   
 
Several reform recommendations advanced in the Watson report were taken up in 
UNSCR 1735, also passed in December 2006.  It elaborated minimal standards for 
statements of case, created a provision for the public release of that information, and 
established a procedure to improve deficiencies in notification. Targets were to be 
provided with a redacted statement of case indicating the basis for listing. As such, 1735 
is the first measure to require notification of those listed - an important element of 
fairness that strengthens legitimacy and also enhances effective implementation.  It is 
difficult for a target to change behavior, if the target is not explicitly informed of its 
proscribed activity. Other changes to extend the No Objections Procedure timeframe 
from 48 hours to 5 working days were also made, allowing more time in capitals for a 
serious review of the case -- an important element of providing for a fair hearing in the 
listing process.  Overall, the reforms contained in 1735 represented important efforts to 
improve the fairness and transparency of regime. 
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Like Minded States Initiatives 
 
On 5 May 2008, an informal group of “like minded states”24 presented suggestions to the 
1267 Committee, elaborating upon an option contained in the Watson Report regarding a 
review mechanism.  Based on a paper by Prof. Michael Bothe (Goethe University 
Frankfurt), the like minded states recommended the creation of an expert panel to review 
delisting petitions, comprised of 3-5 eminent, judicially qualified persons with experience 
in dealing with sensitive information.25  Inspired by the example of World Bank 
inspection panels, the proposal addressed elements of fairness through independence 
(appointment by Security Council upon recommendation of SG), hearing, time-limits (3 
months) for action, and public disclosure of the results. Recommendations of the panel 
were to be advisory only, with ultimate decision-making authority residing with the 
Security Council.  The proposal was made in anticipation of the Security Council’s 
consideration of a resolution in June 2008 extending the mandate of the Monitoring 
Team.  While emphasizing the continued relevance of their previously-proposed panel on 
delisting requests, the group has since developed additional procedural enhancements to 
strengthen listing, delisting, review and exemption procedures, many of which are 
considered in section four.       
 
Human Rights Concerns 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, repeatedly has 
expressed concern about the impact of targeted sanctions on the rights to property and 
freedom of association, as well as potential denials in the listing process of the rights to 
notice and judicial review.26  Among other recommendations, he emphasized that listings 
should be reviewed at least every year to “ensure that sanctions remain temporary and 
preventive, rather than permanent and akin to criminal punishment.”27   
 
In 2008, he laid out a series of options to address due process concerns, including 1) the 
creation of a review mechanism, and 2) the abolition of the 1267 Committee and its 
listings. According to Mr. Scheinin, a review mechanism must include the right of an 
individual to be informed of the measures taken and to know the case against him; the 
right to be heard within a reasonable time by the relevant decision-making body; the right 
                                                 
24 The “Like Minded States” includes Denmark, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
Sweden.  Belgium and Costa Rica associated with the group in 2009.  
25 “Improving the Implementation of Sanctions Regimes Through Ensuring ‘Fair and Clear Procedures.’”  
5 May 2008, at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Terrorism%20%20S%202008%20428.pdf.  The letter was made an official 
document of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council (A/62/861-S/2008/428). See also 
Michael Bothe, “Explanatory Memorandum to the Discussion Paper on Supplementary Guidelines for the 
Review of Sanctions Committees’ Listing Decisions,” 8 November 2007.  Available online at 
http://www.liechtenstein.li/en/pdf-fl-aussenstelle-neyyork-explanatory-memorandum-prof-bothe-delisting-
workshop-2007-11-8.pdf. 
26 Statements by Martin Scheinin, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, to the Human Rights Council and General 
Assembly, at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/rapporteur/statements.htm.   
27 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur, A61/27, 16 August 2006, par 39. 
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to effective review by a competent and independent review mechanism; the right to 
counsel with respect to all proceedings; and the right to an effective remedy. He asserted 
that a quasi-judicial review body of experts serving in their independent capacity “would 
be likely to be recognized by national courts, the EU court and regional human rights 
courts as sufficient analogous protection of due process, so that courts would exercise 
deference in respect of the outcome.”28  With regard to abolishing the 1267 Committee 
and its terrorist listings, the Special Rapporteur stated that UNSCR 1373 would constitute 
a legal basis for national terrorist listing procedures, and the Secretariat would continue to 
provide information, expertise and assistance for the listing by national authorities.  
 
UNSCR 1822 – Significant Changes in Committee Review 
 
In June 2008, the Security Council significantly expanded the 1267 committee’s role in 
addressing listing and delisting issues.  UNSCR 1822 contained new requirements with 
the potential to change dramatically sanctions committee procedures.  First, it required a 
review of all names on the l267 consolidated list within two years (30 June 2010), and an 
ongoing annual review thereafter to ensure that every designation is reviewed at least 
every three years (including those deceased).  Secondly, it required the development of 
narrative summaries (for all listings) which are published on the committee website and 
explain the basis for inclusion of names on the list.  Although it took months of 
negotiations to establish standards and procedures for the review, the 1267 committee 
commenced the review process in late 2008. 
 
The workload associated with the 1822 review has been extraordinary for 1267 
committee members, staff, national governments, and especially those States responsible 
for the most designations or with the largest number of designees either as citizens or 
located in their territory. In order to review the 488 names on the list, a rigorous schedule 
was established in which each trimester, the committee circulates a batch of names to the 
designating State(s) and the State(s) of residence and/or nationality.29 States then have up 
to three months to provide updated information on the reasons for listing, as well as any 
additional identifying or other information. Reviewing states are asked to indicate if the 
listing remains appropriate; if not, a delisting request is submitted according to the 
guidelines. After replies are received from the reviewing states, information is circulated 
to members of the committee and the monitoring team for one month to review and 
provide input, following which the names are placed on the committee’s agenda.   
 
The 1822 review has been a serious, thorough and laborious process for which 
considerable effort has been expended by the committee members, staff, member states, 
and national governments. Initial progress was slower than hoped due to the significant 
workload and delays in getting necessary responses from member states, but the review 
seems to be proceeding at an adequate pace.  Of the original 488 names to be reviewed, 
                                                 
28 See Statement to the 63rd session of the General Assembly, Third Committee, Item 64(b), 22 October 
2008, New York, at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/rapporteur/docs/statementGA221008.doc.  
29 The committee has sent four of the five batches of names to designating states – 422 of the 488 total, 
with the final batch expected in November. 
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the process has been initiated for 422, as of 26 October 2009.30  The committee has 
received about 90 replies and 68 names have been placed on the 1267 committee’s 
agenda.31  As of the end of October, the committee had completed its substantive review 
of 50 names, eight of which have been delisted; 10 additional are pending. Of significant 
note, the 1822 review process seems to have changed the culture of the 1267 committee, 
with much greater discussion and deliberation during meetings rather than only reporting 
instructions from capitols.  Narrative summaries of reasons for listing which are 
accessible on its website, also represent important improvements in the making the 
sanctions regime more transparent, fairer and clearer.32  
 
Perhaps the most visible measure of progress concerns delistings.  Since the adoption of 
UNSCR 1822 on 30 June 2008, eight individuals and four entities have been removed 
from the 1267 consolidated list.  Notable delistings include several subject of litigation – 
Sayadi & Vinck, Himmat, Youssef Nada, as well as Al Barakaat International.33
 
Significant progress has been made in the 1822 review process, yet it is too soon to tell if 
it will succeed in resolving some of the more persistent challenges -- the continued listing 
of deceased persons, entries that do not contain sufficient identifiers/information to allow 
for the positive identification, and removal of individuals associated with the Taliban.  
 
 
SECTION THREE – LITIGATION-RELATED CHALLENGES 
 
Larissa van den Herik and Nico Schrijver*
 
The 2006 Watson report concluded that the right to an effective remedy applied to 
targeted sanctions -- whether such sanctions are administrative or criminal in nature, or 
political measures adopted by the Security Council. Deriving from the fact that 
individuals are personally and directly affected, the right to an effective remedy entails 
elements of independence, impartiality and effectiveness.  
 
The current lack of a delisting procedure that satisfies these elements of an effective 
remedy has generated legal challenges at multiple levels. This resistance comes from not 
only numerous national and regional courts (European Court of First Instance and the 
                                                 
30 Statement by the Chairman of the 1267 Committee to an Open Briefing to Member States, 1 July 2009 at 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/docs/BriefigCMMS.pdf. and additional information provided to 
authors.   
31 For a name to placed on the 1267 committee agenda, replies must be received from designating state(s), 
states of nationality/residence, as well as a complete narrative summary. 
32 Ibid. The 1267 website posts the status of narrative summaries.  As of 23 September 2009, the committee 
had approved 157 narrative summaries of which 123 had been posted on the website. 
33 See 1267 Committee website for updates of the consolidated list and notices on individual and entities 
removed from the list, such as 22 October 2009 statement at, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9773.doc.htm. 
* Larissa van den Herik and Nico Schrijver are respectively Associate Professor and Professor of Public 
International Law at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University, The Netherlands. 
This is a summary of some parts of appendix A. Full references can be found there.  
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European Court of Justice in the cases of Kadi and Al Barakaat), but also from the UN 
Human Rights Committee (in the case of Sayadi and Vinck). Moreover, parliaments and 
domestic legislators have responded to perceived illegitimate UN sanctions regimes. Two 
primary challenges surround the delisting debate, namely (1) the institutional challenges 
pertaining to Security Council review; and (2) the practical challenges relating to 
intelligence-sharing. A third aspect, interrelated with these two challenges and central to 
the review discussion, is the question on the standard of review. 
 
The special position of the Security Council  
 
The overall jurisprudence to date demonstrates a great willingness on the part of regional 
and national courts to formally respect the special position of the Security Council and to 
refrain from direct review. At the same time, regional and national courts cannot 
overlook the gap in legal protection for individuals. This has created a situation in which 
courts are embarking on de facto review of the UN listings. The full implications of this 
situation for sanctions regimes are not yet entirely clear. The consequences of the current 
activity of regional and national courts, however, may reach beyond the sanctions 
regimes. Developments before these courts might well have spill-over effects to the 
general attitude of regional and national courts vis-à-vis the Security Council and its 
Chapter VII resolutions.  
 
The ECJ’s approach in the Kadi case may serve to illustrate the sketched contrast 
between a formal position vis-à-vis the Security Council and the de facto outcome of a 
case. In the Kadi case, the ECJ’s starting point was that the Community judicature could 
not undertake a review of a Chapter VII resolution. Yet, it also held that the EC measures 
implementing the relevant resolutions could be subjected to review on their compatibility 
with fundamental rights. As the ECFI had already pointed out, this reasoning of the ECJ 
led to a de facto review of the UN listings as the EC institutions do not have any 
autonomous discretion in the implementation process. In the process of reviewing the UN 
sanctions regime, the ECJ found the existing re-examination procedure at UN level 
insufficient. The ECJ did not fully embrace the “equivalent protection”-doctrine, which 
implies that the European Courts would defer to a UN panel once this existed and offered 
acceptable protection. The ECJ left open if and under which circumstances it would defer 
to such a mechanism. This demonstrates that once regional and national courts engage 
with Security Council resolutions and regimes, their jurisprudence may get their own 
dynamic. Notably in this case, even though the ECJ formally respected the Security 
Council’s special position, the reality of its reasoning entailed a disregard of the pre-
eminence of the UN Charter and in particular of Article 103 which was not even 
mentioned in the judgment. 
 
Domestic challenges show equal nominal respect of the Security Council’s special 
position, even though they are straightforward and rather severe in their substantive 
criticism. In a recent Canadian challenge to 1267 sanctions that focused on the travel ban 
rather than the assets freeze, the Federal Court heavily criticized the sanctions regime 
comparing the situation of the complainant to Josef K in Kafka’s The Trial. Moreover, it 
is notable that Swiss courts, in the cases of Nada Ebada and Himmat rendered after the 
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ECFI judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat but before the ECJ judgment in these cases, 
followed the ECFI judgment very closely, even though there was no direct obligation to 
do so. This emphasises the potential character of the Kadi judgment as a precedent 
rather than an incident. In relevant cases in the UK, courts have respected the special 
status of the Security Council in that they have looked at the implementing legislation 
rather than directly at the UN listings. They emphasized, however, that designated 
persons should so far as possible be able to know the case against them and to challenge 
it on the merits in special procedures. If in these procedures, the Court would come to the 
conclusion that the listing was not justified, this would impose a duty on the national 
government to support delisting.   
 
Security concerns and intelligence-sharing 
 
The 1267 sanctions are counter-terrorism measures and their application may involve 
classified information that cannot easily be shared with independent reviewers. In the 
Kadi case, the ECJ did not address the intricacies of this matter, but set out rather 
generally that the sole fact that measures were meant to address terrorism and concerned 
national security did not mean that they could escape judicial review. The ECJ put 
forward that in these instances the Community judicature would apply special techniques 
to accommodate legitimate security concerns regarding the nature and sources of the 
information. 
 
The ECFI provided views on classified information in relation to national implementation 
of measures adopted pursuant to UNSCR 1373. In this context, the ECFI left the 
substantive review of files largely to national systems, which have special procedures in 
place to deal with classified information. To the extent that questions of review do arise 
at the level of EC Courts, the ECFI initially left the question open as to whether in the 
context of the right to effective judicial protection, confidential information had to be 
shared with the applicant or whether it could be provided only to the Court so as to 
safeguard public interests. In the so called PMOI II judgment, the ECFI elaborated on the 
issue of classified information. Three documents that supported the listing and that 
France had circulated in the EC Council of Ministers could not be provided to the ECFI 
as they were classified as confidential by France. The ECFI did not accept claims of 
confidentiality, refuting the contention that relevant information could be shared with the 
governments of the 26 other member states but not with the court.  The ECFI held that 
“the Council is not entitled to base its funds-freezing decision on information or material 
in the file communicated by a Member State, if the said Member State is not willing to 
authorize its communication to the Community judicature whose task is to review the 
lawfulness of that decision.” 
 
The possibility that the information might be shared with the applicant might have 
informed France’s unwillingness to provide the requested information. This example 
illustrates that any advisory mechanism should have clear and specific regulations in 
place to deal with classified and other sensitive information. General declarations may 
not suffice in this respect. At the same time, listings cannot be done purely on the basis of 
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classified information in light of existing rights of targeted individuals to know the case 
against them and to have some insight into the evidence adduced against them. 
 
Domestic courts might be better equipped to deal with classified information as often 
special procedures are already in place, as acknowledged by the UK Court in the case 
against G. In this case, the UK had proposed the listing of G to the 1267 Committee and 
therefore the evidence against G was in the possession of the UK government. The 
subsequent UK case against Hay illustrated that domestic courts of States other than the 
designating States, or regional courts, may not necessarily be viable avenues for a merits 
based review, given that a lack of information may exist if the designating State is 
unwilling to share its information.  
 
Standard of review 
 
The security context as part of which the listing decisions are taken may also have an 
impact on the standard of review. In judgments pertaining to national listings pursuant to 
UNSCR 1373, the EC Council of Ministers asserted the broadest discretion as its listing 
decisions were taken in a sphere of “policy choices and political judgment”. According to 
the Council, any judicial review should thus be limited. The ECFI agreed to this. It 
confined its review to ensuring that an adequate national decision was the basis of the 
listing and verifying whether the Council had given reasons as to why it considered it 
necessary to adopt the measures. The ECFI emphasized that the decision to list was a 
discretionary one. In particular in relation to this exercise of the Council’s discretionary 
power and the validity of the reasons to list, the ECFI held that any review should be 
especially limited. As it emphasized, 
 
“Because the Community Courts may not, in particular, substitute their 
assessment of the evidence, facts and circumstances justifying the adoption of 
such measures for that of the Council, the review carried out by the Court of the 
lawfulness of decisions to freeze funds must be restricted to checking that the 
rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, 
that the facts are materially accurate, and that there has been no manifest error of 
assessment of the facts or misuse of power. That limited review applies, 
especially, to the Council’s assessment of the factors as to appropriateness on 
which such decisions are based.” 
 
Hence, the ECFI was reluctant to engage in a full substantive review as to whether the 
evidence in the file supported the listing but rather respected the broad discretionary 
powers of the executive organ responsible for the listing.  
 
 
SECTION FOUR – ASSESSMENT  
 
As noted in the 2006 Watson report, the establishment of fair and clear procedures 
requires both procedural fairness and an effective remedy. Procedural fairness entails 
notification, accessibility, and a fair hearing. Effective remedy requires independence, 
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impartiality, and an ability to grant relief. Three years ago, we remarked that adoption of 
procedural reforms to deal with concerns about the lack of fairness would likely go a long 
way in addressing concerns about unfair and non-transparent sanctions committee 
procedures. In fact, many of the changes made since 2006, discussed in section two, have 
addressed many, though by no means all, due process concerns. What has principally not 
been addressed, however, is the need for an effective remedy in the case of a potentially 
wrongful application of targeted sanctions.   
 
The Security Council has taken significant steps to establish fair and clear procedures, 
through the adoption of UNSCRs 1730, 1735, and especially with the implementation of 
UNSCR 1822. Procedural changes to date generally address concerns about notification 
and improved accessibility, but there have also been improvements in providing elements 
for fair hearing. 
 
First, the No Objection Period (NOP) was extended from 48 hours to 5 working days, 
allowing more time in capitals for a serious review of the case, an important element of 
providing for a fair hearing in the listing process.  
 
Second, UNSCR 1730 created a focal point within the Secretariat to receive delisting 
requests. This is an improvement and addressed the most important, though not all, 
aspects of providing accessibility for those listed. 
 
Third, UNSCR 1735 elaborated on what should be contained in the substantive content of 
the statements of case, provided for the public release of that information, and created a 
procedure to improve deficiencies in notification. This addressed our call to establish 
norms and general standards for the content of statements of case. This also helps ensure 
that application of targeted sanctions is fair and impartial (an important administrative 
standard) and ensure that statements of case include a narrative demonstrating the 
individual or entity’s participation in proscribed activities, both important elements of 
providing for a fair hearing.   
 
Fourth, UNSCR 1735 also determined that to the extent possible, targets should be 
provided with a redacted statement of case indicating the basis for their listing. Making 
public statements of case is an important element of notification and if persuasive, will 
strengthen public legitimacy and enhance effective implementation. Targets should be 
notified by a UN body of their listing, the measures being imposed, and information 
about procedures for exemptions and delisting. Notification is central to procedural 
fairness and although the UN Secretariat still is not directly involved, the more active role 
of the Secretariat in notifying the Permanent Mission of the likely location of individuals 
listed is an improvement. There is still no direct, supplemental notification provided by 
the Secretariat, as recommended in the original Watson Report. 
 
Fifth, the Al Qaida / Taliban Sanctions (1267) Committee has made considerable 
progress under UNSCR 1822 in reviewing all names on the consolidated list as of 30 
June 2008, and requires an annual review of those names that have not been updated in 
three (3) years or more. The reviews address, to some extent, concerns about open-ended 
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asset freezes becoming de facto confiscations of assets. They do not, however, require 
that designations lapse unless reaffirmed by the Sanctions Committee. Rather, by 
operating on the basis of consensus and with the no objection principle, the process tends 
to be biased against making changes to the list. Resolution 1822’s requirement for 
ongoing annual review to ensure that every designation is reviewed at least every three 
years over time, will help to establish consistent (and higher) standards for statements of 
case. This would again contribute to provisional measures that could ensure that the 
application of sanctions follows norms and standards with regard to fairness under 
administrative law, contributing to improvements in providing for fair hearing. 
 
Sixth, UNSCR 1822 made further improvements to the notification process and 
enhancing transparency of the process by releasing information to targets and the general 
public about the reasons for imposing the targeted sanctions and improvements to the 
committee website.  
 
None of the three resolutions, nor any of the other administrative reforms of procedures 
or guidelines adopted at the end of 2008, however, has addressed the question of effective 
remedy or a review mechanism at the UN level. 
 
The Balance Sheet 
 
The adoption and implementation of UNSCRs 1730, 1735, and 1822 constitute an 
important beginning. The procedural changes to date are generally fairly good on 
addressing concerns about notification and improved accessibility. Complete fair hearing 
in advance of a designation is virtually impossible, given the nature of targeted financial 
sanctions in particular, but there have also been improvements with regard to providing 
elements of a fair hearing, notably with regard to periodic review, extending the NOP, 
transparency (releasing redacted statements of case to those designated), and most 
significantly, efforts to improve the quality of statements of case (with the caveats 
identified above).  
 
Some Members of the Security Council are generally satisfied that they have addressed 
the normative, legal, and political concerns of Member States, but more remains to be 
done. 
 
To begin with, there are some important elements of fair hearing that have not yet been 
addressed. In addition to institutionalization of the periodic review of listings and the 
concerted effort on the part of UN Security Council Member States and the 1267 
Monitoring Team to establish higher norms for the substantive content of statements of 
case, it would be useful to establish time limits for responding to listing, delisting, and 
exemption requests. This would address concerns about the problem of indefinite holds 
sometimes placed on exemption or delisting requests (or even a listing request) by a 
single Member of the Security Council.  
 
An even more important way to increase the likelihood of receiving a fair hearing would 
be the introduction of a transparent, inclusive, and genuinely deliberative process for all 
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listing and delisting requests among sanctions committee members. Current committee 
guidelines and practice provide for bilateral consultations and a written silence procedure 
for delisting requests and do not routinely allow such requests to be placed on the agenda 
of committee meetings. Representatives either vote as instructed by their capital, or 
remain silent and make use of the no objection provision. Some form of deliberation, 
which has begun as a result of the 1822 review, might begin to address the concerns of 
the European Court of Justice about the absence of any review mechanisms at the UN 
level. 
 
Because committee decisions are taken by consensus which has been interpreted as 
unanimity, committee action on delisting requests can and often has been blocked by a 
single negative vote. To overcome structural constraints in the sanctions committee’s 
decision-making process, changes in committee procedures to place the onus on the 
dissenting member should be considered. This could include requiring a written 
justification of reasons for opposition to delisting requests, new procedures that require 
deceased individuals or those listings for whom there are inadequate identifiers to expire 
within a limited time, or ultimately a change in committee decision-making procedures 
that permits voting or a new understanding of consensus that does not equate to 
unanimity. 
  
The largest failing of the existing regime, however, remains the virtual silence on 
provisions for providing an effective remedy. The reforms to date do not deal with the 
need for an effective remedy in the case of a wrongful application of a targeted sanction. 
This continues to be the most difficult and unresolved issue and options for consideration 
of ways of addressing it are presented in the following section.  
 
 
SECTION FIVE – OPTIONS  
 
Broadly speaking, there are three principal approaches that could be pursued to address 
the remaining due process issues related to fair hearing and effective remedy and attempt 
to rescue the instrument of targeted sanctions from being undermined by challenges to its 
current use: 
 
A. Amend existing sanctions committee procedures to remove or address “problem” 
cases, strengthen the quality of the list, impose time-limits on designations, and 
approximate a fair hearing for designees;  
B. Rely on formal reviews of designations at the national or regional level; or 
C. Create a review mechanism at the UN level. 
 
These are not entirely mutually exclusive and could potentially be used in combination.34  
We have suggested arguments for and against each option (pros and cons).   
 
                                                 
34 It is important to note that whatever changes are adopted in the 1267 context, they are likely (indeed 
should be) replicated across other sanctions regimes. 
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A. Procedural Enhancements of Sanctions Committee Processes 
 
(1) Use the ongoing 1822 review of previous designations to update the list to be 
reflective of current threats and remove “toxic designations” from the from the 
1267 consolidated list. Just as financial institutions have removed toxic assets 
from their books, the 1267 committee should remove designations for which it 
cannot make a compelling case. The strongest possible public case in support of 
remaining designations should be made through the publication of comprehensive 
narrative summaries.  
 
Pros: Improves integrity and relevance of list; addresses political problems 
associated with contentious cases; enhances legitimacy of UN Security Council 
imposition of targeted sanctions 
 
Cons: Perceived as status quo and does not address perception of injustice 
associated with 1267 designations; some legal challenges likely to continue 
 
(2) Impose time limits on listings, ensuring that they are not open-ended, de 
facto permanent designations. Designations will be valid for three years, after 
which agreement of the sanctions committee is necessary to continue listing (in 
effect, a sunset, in which designations expire unless reaffirmed by the committee).  
 
Pros: Addresses argument that designations are punitive, not preventive, and 
entail unwarranted denial of fundamental rights to property and movement; 
periodic review of list enhances credibility, political will, and therefore, effective 
implementation; defaults to decision (rather than current system of indecision), as 
name comes off list without agreement to maintain the designation; strengthens 
the quality of the list overall. 
 
Cons: Time limitations place pressure on committee and members to act; 
increases workload burden on secretariat staff and especially national 
governments; bias towards delisting rather than maintaining designation; unlikely 
to forestall further legal challenges on its own. 
 
(3) Introduce new procedures to increase transparency and approximate “fair 
hearing” for consideration of delisting requests by the committee.  
 
(a) Ensure that a complete package for committee review is prepared, 
including responses of petitioners and additional relevant information, 
such as copies of legal proceedings and judgments at the national and 
regional level to be considered as part of the review. (The monitoring team, 
expert group, or focal point could compile this information.)  
 
(b) Provide a more transparent, inclusive, and genuinely deliberative 
process among committee members; enable the committee to deliberate, to 
compare cases, establish committee precedents, and a basis for 
institutional learning;  delisting requests should be routinely placed on the 
agenda of, and discussed at, committee meetings. 
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(c) Designate the focal point as clearinghouse for: notification of listings 
(in addition to states of residence and nationality); receipt of exemption 
requests; general information regarding sanctions regimes and procedures 
to applicants; responses to applicants concerning the outcome of delisting 
and exemption requests, providing reasons for denial; and regular reports 
on activities, including suggestions for administrative improvements 
 
Pros: Provides important elements of fair hearing at the UN level, without 
creating a formal review procedure or creating a new institution  
 
Cons: Does not address need for effective remedy by an independent and 
impartial reviewer able to grant relief 
 
(4) Change committee procedures to overcome structural constraints that 
inhibit progress on delisting (delays/blocking) and expedite decisions 
 
(a) Adopt special procedures according privileged status to original 
designating state for delisting requests (shortened timeframe or semi-
automaticity of request);  
 
(b) Require holds to expire or be converted to formal block after a set 
timeframe, unless written justification for additional time is provided; 
 
(c) Require committee members opposing a delisting request (i.e. hold or 
formal block) to provide reasons for their decision; 
 
(d) Introduce “default-to-decision” procedures for deceased individuals or 
those listings in which there are inadequate identifiers (e.g. presumption 
that designations lacking identifiers expire in 3 months) 
 
(e) Change committee decision-making procedures (consensus without 
unanimity or possible voting in committee); 
 
Pros:  Demonstrates continued procedural reform  
 
Cons: Insufficient to address significant concerns about improving fair 
hearing and does not address need for effective remedy by an independent and 
impartial reviewer able to grant relief 
 
B. National or Regional-level Review 
 
(1) Defer to national measures to ensure that listings meet domestic legal 
standards of each member states (e.g. conduct a national-level review before 
submitting/approving names for potential UN listing, allowing judicial review of 
classified information).   
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Pros: Consistent with traditional local remedies rule and the complementarity  
principle to defer to national procedures in the first instance; utilizes existing legal 
remedies and review procedures, including handling of classified intelligence, in 
camera procedures; enhances confidence that due process concerns are addressed. 
 
Cons: Lack of common standards across different national jurisdictions could 
undermine effectiveness of UN counterterrorism framework, increase 
inconsistencies in member states’ approaches, undermine committee’s role in 
assisting with designations, and reduce transparency. Likely to lead to fewer 
listings, increased litigation, be unenforceable, and may not address challenges 
that arise after the listing.  
 
(2) Conduct a retrospective hearing at the national level in state proposing the 
listing within a reasonable period of time, with a statement of case made available 
to designated individual and designee given opportunity to respond (deference to 
national procedures is modeled after existing EU procedures for autonomous 
listings pursuant to Resolution 1373). A decision by national courts of the 
designating states that proposal to list was unjustified would be binding on 
sanctions committee, or result in immediate 1822 review.  
 
Pros: Relies on existing legal remedies and review procedures (e.g. handling of 
intelligence information, in camera processes) at the national/ regional level, 
without the need for Security Council review (decision that is reviewed is 
designating state’s proposal to list rather than Sanctions Committee’s decision to 
list); accords a privileged status to designating state by permitting it to withdraw 
listing following domestic court proceeding. 
 
Cons: Quality of review is dependent on political context and legal culture, which 
varies across different national jurisdictions and time periods; attempts to address 
global threats through national measures; redacted statement of case may preclude 
substantive review; lack of adequate national listing/delisting mechanisms and 
procedures in many states; complications of multiple co-designating states. 
  
(3) Rely on national or regional-level designations in lieu of UN listings.  
Abolish the 1267 Committee and list, utilizing instead UNSCR 1373 as the legal 
basis for making terrorist designations at the national/regional levels.    
 
Pros: Utilizes existing procedures based on national decision of a law 
enforcement/judicial authority to list; defers to national/regional procedures for 
handling intelligence information, in camera processes, etc 
 
Cons: Weakens multilateral counterterrorism regime through lack of parallel 
implementation across different jurisdictions (most of whom do not maintain lists 
independent of UN designations); attempts to address global threats through 
national measures; weakens role of UN Security Council in the maintaining 
international peace and security.  
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C. UN Review Mechanism35
 
(1) Create an advisory review mechanism under the Security Council‘s 
authority to make recommendations regarding delisting requests.  
 
Potential institutional forms of non-binding mechanisms include: 
 
(a) Subgroup of Security Council members (not including original 
designating state) to consider sanctions committee denial of delisting 
requests. Subgroup of 3 members (current or former Security Council (SC) 
members) convened on ad hoc basis to consider delisting requests, and 
make a recommendation to the Security Council.   
 
Pros: Group of Member States other than designating state reviewing 
sanctions committee decision, and with change in membership of the non-
P-5; no new institutional structure and could be staffed by Secretariat 
 
Cons: Unlikely to be considered impartial or adequately independent since 
other SC members would often have concurred in original listing decision; 
potentially administratively complicated if each delisting request 
necessitated a new subgroup 
 
(b) Monitoring Team (MT) role expanded to include evaluation of 
delisting requests (including assessment of relationship of listed party to 
Al-Qaida / Taliban threat), analysis, and recommendation to sanctions 
committee as to the merits of delisting requests. 
 
Pros: Administratively easy, as it builds on existing structure; represents 
limited degree of “independence” as Secretary General (SG) appoints MT 
members; demonstrates Council’s commitment to further reform of 
delisting procedures to be more fair and clear;  
 
Cons: Unlikely to be considered sufficiently analogous protection of due 
process so as to encourage courts to exercise deference; not sufficiently 
independent in decision-making authority or ability to grant relief; 
perception of conflict of interest and complications posed by MT 
becoming arbiter of delisting decisions; further distracts MT from core 
mission of assisting the 1267 Committee in enhancing effectiveness of 
measures and their implementation by Member States, and risks loss of 
MT’s credibility and trust in performing review functions  
 
(c) Ombudsperson (eminent person likely with diplomatic or judicial 
experience appointed by SG in consultation with SC) to make 
recommendations to Security Council on delisting requests (only) 
appealed from Sanction Committee decisions. Ombudsperson would 
ensure broad-based review of requests taking into account all factors 
                                                 
35 Within each institutional form of a non-binding appeal mechanism is a range of choices as to the specific 
elements of the mechanism – composition, authority, powers, transparency, etc.  Variations of each option 
are possible.  
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(concerns of designating states, maintenance of international peace & 
security, and assurance of fair and clear procedures). 
 
Pros: independently appointed and makes independent recommendation to 
Security Council; enhanced perception of fairness and demonstration of 
Council’s commitment to fair and clear procedures; courts may consider 
ombudsperson as sufficient analogous protection of due process and 
exercise deference;  
 
Cons: Limited ability to provide effective remedy, since although 
recommendations may be made public, they are non-binding; therefore 
may not fully satisfy court concerns  
 
(d) Advisory panel (consisting of 3 eminent impartial persons appointed 
by the SG in consultation with the Security Council) to consider delisting 
requests and make recommendations to the Security Council.  Available to 
the petitioner and transparent through public summary report 
 
Pros: Most likely non-binding option to address legal concerns for 
independent and impartial review, thereby avoiding complications of 
courts imposing more stringent standards for listing 
 
Cons: Potentially significant institutional and operational costs of 
establishing a quasi-judicial entity within Security Council structure, 
especially for relatively few cases; perceived infringement upon Security 
Council authority; complications of sharing classified intelligence 
information  
 
(2) Establish an independent judicial body with competence to review decisions 
of sanctions committees denying delisting requests. Based on precedents of the 
Security Council creating subsidiary bodies for other priorities, such as the 
specially-constituted tribunals (International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia - ICTY), a group of experts with appropriate experience would be 
appointed by the Secretary General to hear delisting appeals; decisions would be 
binding and public 
 
Pros:  Provides an effective remedy through the elements of independence, ability 
to grant relief, and accessibility; likely to avert court challenges to UN targeted 
sanctions as violations of international human rights standards due to relative 
complementarity. Enhance legitimacy, perceptions of fairness and allow SC to 
keep control of sanctions 
 
Cons: Perceived to infringe upon Security Council’s authority. Potentially 
significant institutional and operational costs for relatively few cases, and 
problems associated with access to classified information. Could weaken the 
authority of the Security Council if sanctions committees decisions are frequently 
challenged  
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Table II: Comparison of Review Mechanism Options36  
 
 
           Comparison of Review Mechanism Options 
  Security 
Council 
Subgroup 
Monitoring 
Team 
Ombuds-
person 
Advisory 
Panel 
Judicial 
Review 
 
Composition 
 
 
 
 
3 Security Council 
members (past or 
current, but not 
designating state) 
on ad hoc, rotating 
basis, appointed 
by S-G 
 
 
Existing 1267 
Monitoring 
Team, 
appointed by  
S-G  
 
One 
eminent 
person, 
appointed 
by S-G 
 
Three 
eminent 
persons,  
appointed 
by S-G 
 
New 
subsidiary 
body created 
by UNSC with 
delegated 
authority 
Independence 
Independently 
appointed? 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
Impartiality 
 Independent to make 
decisions? 
 
 
 
 
SOMEWHAT 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
Authority 
Competent 
to grant relief? 
 
 
 
 
SOMEWHAT 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
Accessibility 
Accessible by 
individuals? 
 
 
 
 
POSSIBLE 
 
POSSIBLE 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
Investigatory power 
Access to 
information? 
 
 
 
 
SOME 
 
YES 
 
SOME 
 
SOME 
 
YES 
Hearing 
Petitioner able to be 
heard? 
 
 
 
 
NO 
 
UNLIKELY 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
Transparency 
Decisions made 
public? 
 
 
 
 
POSSIBLE 
 
POSSIBLE 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
                                                 
36 A review mechanism would only be accessible after the petitioner has already gone through the existing 
delisting procedures and received a response from the sanctions committee. As such, the first four of these 
options are ad hoc, as there is no need for a standing body to handle the minimal number of appeals. With 
the exception of judicial review, the advice rendered by the other review mechanisms would be directed to 
the Security Council, a body separate from the sanctions committee that made the delisting decision which 
is being appealed.  
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SECTION SIX – RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Even if the total number is small and committee procedures have improved, the 
persistent perception of unfairness and potential violation of due process 
associated with targeted sanctions means there is a political problem that needs 
to be addressed.  Failure to make the sanctions process more transparent, 
accessible and subject to some form of review threatens to undermine the 
credibility and effectiveness of UN sanctions generally.  
 
The passage above, from the 2006 Watson Report, is as applicable today, as it was when 
it was written more than three and one-half years ago. Only now, the need for action is 
more urgent. The political problem has only grown worse, with criticism expanding 
beyond measures to counter terrorism to disparagement of the instrument of targeted 
sanctions more generally. Continued challenges without what is perceived as an adequate 
response, risks the Security Council’s legitimacy and future ability to utilize such tools 
effectively to act against threats to international peace and security. Taking the initiative 
to address the issue proactively could help to avert future court challenges that may look 
beyond procedural requirements to examine the substantive (intelligence) reasons for 
making the designations.  
 
Sanctions committee procedural reforms 
 
Improvements in sanctions committee procedures as presented in Option A in the 
preceding section, are helpful in demonstrating further resolve by the Security Council to 
make sanctions more fair and clear. The 1267 Committee has repeatedly adapted its 
procedures, and the options in Section 4(a) would continue this progress, though taken 
alone, would by no means be sufficient to address the larger political and legal challenges 
facing targeted sanctions.  
 
Removing a significant number of designations (especially certain causes célèbres) 
through the 1822 review process will help to strengthen and restore credibility to the list.  
Progress on delisting deceased individuals and Taliban members willing to work with the 
Afghan government also will enhance confidence in the continuing relevance of the 
sanctions. Narrative summaries for those remaining on the list should be thorough and 
publicly compelling, with strong arguments as to why particular individuals remain listed.  
 
Likewise, modest procedural adjustments, such an expanded administrative role for the 
focal point and /or enhanced information-gathering and assessment responsibilities for 
the monitoring team in delisting requests would make important improvements to the 
current process. Reforming committee procedures to be more transparent and deliberative 
(i.e. requiring explanations for holds, expedited procedures, and periodic reviews) are 
also helpful and should be implemented. Even the difficult matter of changing committee 
decision-making procedures (possible voting in committee) could result in overcoming 
structural constraints endemic to sanctions committees and breaking some of the logjams 
that have stymied progress on delisting in the past. 
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Incremental or marginal improvements of committee procedures alone, however, will not 
address effectively the larger political problem or regain control of the debate over fair 
and clear procedures. Bold, proactive measures to address the fundamental issue of 
effective remedy are needed.   
 
National level measures 
 
The second category of options – to rely on national or regional-level review – is 
appealing because of its potential to address problems of fair hearing, access to sensitive 
information, and consistency with established legal procedures (with precedence given to 
national measures). The first two options, relying on national measures at the listing stage, 
would provide a basis for fair hearing and effective remedy, but assume that fair judicial 
hearings could be conducted similarly across widely varying national jurisdictions and in 
highly charged political contexts (such as those immediately following a major act of 
terrorism). The third option, relying on national or regional-level designations, taken on 
its own, would seriously undermine the effectiveness of a global counterterrorism regime. 
For example, very few Member States maintain autonomous lists. If there were no UN 
list, countries that lack their own autonomous lists or procedures to create them would 
not participate in the global counter-terrorism regime. The possibility for regulatory 
arbitrage would be high, and parallel implementation would disappear. This would 
severely weaken the utility of the targeted sanctions instrument in promoting 
international peace and security.  
 
Measures at the UN level 
 
Establishing a review mechanism at the UN level represents the best prospect of 
effectively addressing the legal and political challenges to targeted sanctions. Creative 
thinking on the full range of issues – procedural, legal, and political – is called for to 
meet contemporary challenges of global governance in this issue domain. It is time to 
move beyond traditional arguments about Security Council prerogatives. While there are, 
without question, practical difficulties in establishing any kind of advisory or review 
body, they appear, to be far outweighed by the real and current dilemmas Member States 
face in being able carry out their obligations under the UN Charter without violating 
domestic laws.  
 
Although the legal and political challenges represent a serious threat to the efficacy of 
targeted sanction, they also present opportunities to regain control of the due process 
issue before courts go beyond procedural review and begin to examine underlying 
substance. To date, courts have demonstrated great willingness to respect the special 
position of the Security Council and refrain from direct review. Because of persistent 
challenges without a perceived adequate response, however, the current trajectory 
implies greater court intervention in the substantive aspects of UN listing decisions. In 
the words of the 1267 Monitoring Team, “one reason to create a panel or other review 
mechanism is simply to get ahead of the law in this area, to establish it, rather than allow 
national and regional courts or Member State practice to do so…. the Committee might 
be well advised to establish the desired standard of review, rather than effectively cede 
this role to others.”37  
                                                 
37 Tenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Implementation Monitoring Team, 31 July 2009, 
UN Doc.S/2009/502, para. 42, available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/monitoringteam.shtml
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Beyond the imperative to deal preemptively with the issue before courts adversely rule on 
the subject, the distracting nature and inordinate resources associated with delisting issues 
is cause for concern. As noted previously, extraordinary effort has been devoted to the 
1822 review at all levels, and the positive results are important. With finite time and 
resources, however, the fact remains that less progress is being made in addressing the 
core preventive goals of the counterterrorism sanctions. Concerted initiatives to focus on 
implementation by Member States, capacity building assistance, and understanding the 
ever-changing threat from Al Qaida and the Taliban have been limited. Notwithstanding 
the considerable resources devoted to delisting issues, perceptions regarding the lack of 
appropriate protection of individual rights persist, and attention continues to be diverted 
from enhancing the effectiveness of measures to counter the threat.38  From a practical 
standpoint, it is extremely unlikely that fundamental objectives of strengthening targeted 
sanctions will advance without adequately addressing the delisting issue.  
 
Critics of UN-level review mechanisms have characterized Option C alternatives as 
costly and a potentially significant increase in workload. Yet, with the exception of 
judicial review, the other institutional alternatives would only be utilized on an ad hoc 
basis, and after existing committee procedures to appeal listing decisions have been 
exhausted. Similar arguments about costs were made during deliberations surrounding 
the creation of the focal point in 2006, but as the chart on page 13 indicates, the workload 
has been manageable, and fairly minimal. 
 
There are a variety of different institutional forms a review mechanism could take, but 
they are distinguished primarily by whether it is an advisory body, or whether its 
decisions – even if strictly limited to delisting appeals and based on a delegated authority 
by the Security Council itself – are binding. The latter would meet the standard of 
effective remedy more readily than an advisory body, but depending on the specific 
institutional form, even an advisory body could approximate important elements of 
effective remedy, as long as its decisions were made public. Among the various options 
for an advisory mechanism outlined in the table on page 29, the appointment of an 
Ombudsperson would be simplest and easiest to implement. It would also meet minimum 
standards of independence with the smallest institutional infrastructure. An advisory 
panel of eminent, impartial persons would likely be perceived as more independent, 
however. 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid, para. 35. 
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Conclusion 
 
The goal of further reform should not be to minimize the probability of future legal 
challenges to specific targeted sanctions designations. It is impossible to know with 
certainty if any of these measures, taken singly or in combination, would ever be 
sufficient to prevent or forestall future legal challenges to the targeted sanctions regime. 
This argument has been advanced by some as a reason not to consider more ambitious 
options, such as the creation of a review mechanism at the UN level. Such thinking, in 
our view, is a prescription for inaction, perpetuates the cycle of reactive measures by the 
UNSC, weakens the instrument of targeted sanctions, and risks the credibility of the 
Security Council.  
 
In the final analysis, we hope that the Council will consider a broad range of options, and 
ultimately opt for a creative combination of proposals to address the remaining issues 
associated with fair hearing and effective remedy. Rather than choosing among the 
different options at the sanctions committee level, the national level, or the UN level, we 
think it would be best to combine elements drawn from several of them. A more robust 
1822 review process, incorporating many of the changes recommended above, in 
combination with the establishment of a review mechanism at the Security Council level 
would be the most effective way to address the continuing and deepening challenges to 
the legitimacy of UN targeted sanctions. These steps should be undertaken not only 
because they are pragmatic and prudent, but also because protecting fundamental human 
rights is the best way to strengthen targeted sanctions. 
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APPENDIX  A:  Delisting Challenges in the Context of UN Targeted Sanctions 
Regimes: A Legal Perspective  
 
Larissa van den Herik and Nico Schrijver39
 
Introduction 
In this section, recent litigation regarding the 1267 sanctions regime is analysed. The 
Kadi and Al Barakaat judgements of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) take a central 
place. By way of comparison, EU case law pertaining to the parallel sanctions based on 
Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) is examined. In addition, relevant domestic case 
law is scrutinized, as well as a legal view from within the UN human rights system, 
namely of the Human Rights Committee in the Sayadi and Vinck case. In the analysis, 
specific attention is paid to the two main challenges that surround the delisting debate, as 
identified by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, namely (i) the 
institutional challenges pertaining to Security Council review; and (ii) the practical 
challenges relating to intelligence-sharing.40
 
1.    The Kadi and Al Barakaat Judgements 
In the previous Watson report, the judgements of the European Court of First Instance 
(ECFI) in the cases of Kadi and Yusuf and Al Barakaat were examined.41 In these cases, 
the claimants argued that the sanctions imposed on them pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1267 and implementing EC legislation infringed on their human rights.42 In 
its judgements, delivered on 21 September 2005, the ECFI dismissed the challenges.43 
On 3 September 2008, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered its long awaited 
appeal judgement in the cases of Kadi and Al Barakaat.44 The ECJ upheld the appeal. It 
                                                 
39 Larissa van den Herik and Nico Schrijver are respectively Associate Professor and Professor of Public 
International Law at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University. 
40 Cf. para. 41 of the eight report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, 31 March 
2008, UN Doc. S/2008/324: “It is difficult to imagine that the Security Council could accept any review 
panel that appeared to erode its absolute authority to take actions on matters affecting international peace 
and security, as enshrined in the Charter. This argues against any panel having more than an advisory role, 
and against publication of its opinions to avoid undercutting Council decisions. It would argue too for the 
Council to retain authority to select or approve the membership of a review body. Finally, solutions also 
would have to be found to the many evidentiary problems associated with a review panel. Although the 
panel might be allowed access to the confidential statements of case presented to justify listings, 
Committee members also draw on intelligence and law-enforcement information available to them 
nationally or through other sources, including information obtained by bilateral exchanges, which could not 
easily be made available to reviewers.” 
41 UN Doc. A/60/887 and S/2006/331, 14 June 2006, in particular section 2. 
42 Similar claims have been made in the cases of ECFI, Faraj Hassan v. Council of the European Union 
and Commission of the European Communities, Judgement, Case No. T-49/04, 12 June 2006 and ECFI, 
Chafiq Ayadi v. Council of the European Union, Judgement, Case No. T-253/02, 12 July 2006. 
43 ECFI, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, Judgement, Case No. T-306/01, 21 September 2005; Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, 
Judgement, Case No. T-315/01, 21 September 2005 (further referred to as “ECFI, Kadi judgement”).  
44 ECJ, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union, 
judgement, Case Nos. C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, 3 September 2008 (further referred to as “ECJ, Kadi 
udgement”). Pending his appeal, Yusuf was delisted by the Sanctions Committee and his case was 
discontinued. On 22 October, Al Barakaat was also delisted. The ECFI has followed the ECJ reasoning in, 
Omar Mohammed Othman v Council and Commission, Judgment, case no. T-318/01, 11 June 2009. 
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set aside the ECFI judgements and annulled the relevant EC Regulations to the extent that 
they concerned the claimants. 
 
1.1. The challenge of Security Council Review 
In their judgements, both the ECFI and the ECJ started their reasoning from the finding 
that they did not have the power to review Security Council resolutions.45 However, both 
institutions formulated exceptions to this rule. The ECFI held that it could indirectly 
review whether the relevant Security Council resolutions respected jus cogens norms, i.e., 
norms accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as 
norms from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by 
subsequent norms of general international law having the same character.46 The ECFI 
viewed jus cogens as a higher body of norms binding on all subjects of international law, 
including United Nations organs, and from which no derogation was allowed.47 The ECJ 
dismissed this position and held that the Community judicature could in fact not 
undertake such a review of a resolution adopted by an international body.48 The ECJ 
made a distinction between the international resolution and the implementing EC 
measure. It argued that in contrast to the Security Council resolution, this latter 
implementing measure could be subjected to review given that all community acts could 
be reviewed by the community judicature on their compatibility with fundamental 
rights.49 For human rights are viewed as part and parcel of the European Community’s 
legal order. 
 
Even though the ECJ did not admit this explicitly, its line of reasoning gave in effect rise 
to an indirect review of the relevant Security Council resolution. In its judgement, the 
ECFI had already acknowledged that reviewing the implementing community measure 
would amount to an indirect review of the underlying Security Council resolutions, as 
these resolutions left the EC institutions no autonomous discretion in the implementation 
process.50 In contrast, the ECJ maintained that the UN Charter left a “free choice among 
the various possible models for transposition of these resolutions into their domestic legal 
order”51 The ECJ thus concluded in a somewhat enigmatic paragraph, 
 
“It follows from all those considerations that it is not a consequence of the principles governing 
the international legal order under the United Nations that any judicial review of the internal 
lawfulness of the contested regulation in the light of fundamental freedoms is excluded by virtue 
of the fact that that measure is intended to give effect to a resolution of the Security Council 
adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations.”52
 
In all, the ECJ held that it was empowered, even obliged, to undertake a full review of the 
EC measures that implemented the 1267 sanctions regime.53
                                                 
45 ECFI, Kadi judgement, para. 225 and ECJ, Kadi judgement, para. 287. 
46 Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
47 ECFI, Kadi judgement, para. 226. 
48 ECJ, para Kadi judgement,. 287. 
49 ECJ, Kadi judgement, paras. 281-288, and para. 314. 
50 ECFI, Kadi judgement, paras. 214-216. 
51 ECJ, Kadi judgement, para. 298. 
52 ECJ, Kadi judgement, para. 299. 
53 ECJ, Kadi judgement, para. 326. 
 35 
 
In undertaking this review, In the process of reviewing the UN sanctions regime, the ECJ 
found the existing re-examination procedure at UN level insufficient. The ECJ did not 
fully embrace the “equivalent protection”-doctrine,54 which implies that the European 
Courts would defer to a UN panel once this would exist and would offer acceptable 
protection. The ECJ left it open if and under which circumstances it would defer to such a 
mechanism. This demonstrates that once regional and national courts engage with 
Security Council resolutions and regimes, their jurisprudence may get their own 
dynamics. Notably in this case, even though the ECJ formally respected the Security 
Council’s special position, the reality of its reasoning entailed a disregard of the pre-
eminence of the UN Charter and in particular of Article 103 which was not even 
mentioned in the judgement.  
 
More concretely, the ECJ came to the conclusion that the principle of effective judicial 
protection had been violated, as well as the human right of defence and the right to be 
heard.55 The ECJ came to this finding on the basis of the fact that the EC measures did 
not include a procedure for communicating the evidence on the basis of which persons 
had been listed, nor a procedure for hearing the persons at the time of their inclusion or 
later. In addition, at no point in time had the Council informed Kadi and Al Barakaat of 
the evidence used against them. By lack of any information, the ECJ concluded it could 
not itself review whether the regulation was lawful in so far as it pertained to Kadi and Al 
Barakaat. It thus annulled the regulation on the basis that procedural rights had been 
violated.56 In response to the judgement and in order to stay within the three months time 
limit, the EC Commission annunciated a new Regulation 1109/2008 on 6 November 
2008 which provided for the obligation to indicate to individuals the grounds on which 
they had been listed and the opportunity for individuals to comment on these grounds.57 
Consistent with that Regulation, Kadi and Al Barakaat remained listed and have been 
provided with reasons for their listing. These narrative summaries had been transmitted 
by the Sanctions Committee on 21 October 2008, on a “non-precedent basis”.58 While Al 
Barakaat has been delisted, Kadi’s challenge to the decision to maintain his name on the 
list is still before the European Courts.59  
 
1.2. The challenge of intelligence-sharing 
In its line of reasoning, the ECJ ignored that the Council might not have possessed all or 
sufficient evidence that justified the listing of Kadi and Al Barakaat or it might not have 
been in a position to transmit this evidence.60 The ECJ did acknowledge that the 
                                                 
54 The “equivalent protection – doctrine” was set out by the European Court of Human Rights, ECtHR, 
Case of Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turzïm ve Tïcaret Anonïm Şïrketï v. Ireland, Application no. 45036/98, 
Grand Chamber, 30 June 2005, para. 155-156. Advocate-General Maduro also left some more room for 
such deference in his opinion, Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-402/05, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v 
Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, 16 January 2008, para. 54. 
55 ECJ, Kadi judgement, para. 353. In para. 351, the ECJ also held that the right to an effective legal 
remedy had been violated. 
56 ECJ, Kadi judgement, paras. 345-353. 
57 OJ L 299/23. 
58 UN Doc. SC/9498, 12 November 2008. 
59 ECFI, Kadi v. Commission, Application, Case No. T-85/09, 26 February 2009 and ECFI, Al Barakaat v. 
Commission, Application, Case No. T-45/09. 
60 This was acknowledged by the ECFI, Kadi judgement, para. 258. 
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imposition of the sanctions on Kadi and Al Barakaat could well be justified and it was for 
this reason that it granted the Council a three month period to remedy the 
infringements.61 The ECJ did not give any more specific guidance as to how the 
procedure could be remedied, or more specifically how the Council could ensure that the 
information justifying the listing at UN level and often at the initiative of non-EU 
members would be accessible to the listed person or to the Court. It only set out rather 
generally that the sole fact that measures were meant to address terrorism and concerned 
national security did not mean that they could escape judicial review and that in these 
instances the Community judicature would apply special techniques to accommodate 
legitimate security concerns regarding the nature and sources of the information.62 In its 
proposal for a new EC Regulation, the Commission mentions the issue of classified 
information, but does not tackle it decisively. It proposes that a provision should be made 
to deal with classified information that may be provided by the United Nations or a by a 
third State.63
 
2. EU judgements in the context of the 1373 sanctions 
Parallel to the 1267 sanctions, more general anti-terrorism sanctions are applied pursuant 
to Resolution 1373. This Resolution obliges States to freeze funds,64 but it decentralises 
the identification process of persons against whom the sanctions should be applied. In the 
context of the EU, listing is done at EU level by the Council on the basis of national 
decisions. More specifically, Resolution 1373 was implemented in the EU by Common 
Positions 2001/930/CFSP and 2001/931/CFSP.65 According  to Article 1(4) of Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP, persons can be listed on the basis of “precise information or 
material in the relevant file which indicates that a decision has been taken by a competent 
authority in respect of persons, groups and entities concerned, irrespective of whether it 
concerns the instigation of investigations or prosecution for a terrorist act, an attempt to 
perpetrate, participate in or facilitate such an act based on serious and credible evidence 
or clues, or condemnation for such deeds.”  A competent authority is a judicial authority 
or an equivalent competent authority if judicial authorities have no competence in the 
relevant area. Following Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, the list is to 
be reviewed at least once every six months.66 The list is established in specific Council 
Decisions and has regularly been updated after its first establishment on 27 December 
2001.67 Several listed persons, both natural persons and legal entities, have challenged 
their inclusion in the list. A leading case concerns the Organisation des Modjahedines du 
peuple d’ Iran (OMPI) or People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). This 
organization was eventually removed by the Council from the list in January 2009. The 
ECFI had annulled the decision to list and maintain the entity on the list in three 
                                                 
61 ECJ, Kadi Judgement, para. 374. 
62 ECJ, Kadi Judgement, para. 344. 
63 COM (2009) 187, 22 April 2009, para. 9. 
64 Para. 1 (c) of Resolution 1373. 
65 Resp. OJ 2001 L 344, p. 90 and OJ 2001 L 344, p. 93. 
66 For more on the notion of what does and does not constitute a decision taken by a competent authority, 
see ECFI, Jose Maria Sison v. Council of the European Union, Judgement, Case No. T-341/07, 30 
September 2009. 
67  Council Decision 2001/927/EC, OJ 2001 L 344, p. 83, pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2580/2001, OJ 2001 L 344, p. 70. 
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subsequent judgements on 12 December 2006, 23 October 2008 and 4 December 2008. 
Subsequent case law of the ECFI on EU 1373-freezing measures has followed the OMPI 
precedent, therefore the analysis below centres on this case.68  
 
Just as in the case of Kadi and Al Barakaat, the invoked rights in OMPI were the right to 
a fair hearing, the obligation to state reasons, and the right to effective judicial 
protection.69 However, as the ECFI emphasised in the OMPI judgement, unlike the 
measures taken against Kadi and Al Barakaat, the decision to list OMPI was not taken at 
UN level and therefore did not “benefit from the primacy effect”.70 The question of 
Security Council review thus did not present a challenge in this context. Still, the Council 
argued that it enjoyed the broadest discretion as its listing decisions were taken in a 
sphere of “policy choices and political judgement”. According to the Council, any 
judicial review should thus be limited.71 The ECFI agreed to this. Yet, in the OMPI case, 
even this limited review led to annulment. Specifically in relation to the obligation to 
state reasons, the Council held that the statement of reasons should “indicate the actual 
and specific reasons why the Council consider[ed] that the relevant rules were applicable 
to the party concerned.”72 This entailed notification of the national decision which lied at 
the basis of the listing.73 The failure to inform listed persons of the relevant national 
decision which was at the basis of their listing at EU level led to annulment of the listing 
decision in OMPI, as well as in most other cases before the ECFI.74  
 
In addition to the requirement of indicating which national decision lie at the basis of the 
listing, the ECFI also required the Council to give reasons as to why it considered it 
necessary to adopt the measure in respect of the person concerned. The ECFI emphasised 
that the decision to list was a discretionary one, and that there was no duty to list.75 In 
particular in relation to this exercise of the Council’s discretionary power, the ECFI held 
that any review should be especially limited.  
                                                 
68 ECFI, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’ Iran v. Council of the European Union, Judgement, 
Case No. T-228/02, 12 December 2006 (further referred to as “ECFI, OMPI judgement”), ECFI; People’s 
Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Council of the European Union, Judgement, Case No. T-256/07, 23 
October 2008 further referred to as “ECFI, PMOI I judgement”); People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran 
v. Council of the European Union, Judgement, Case No. T-284/08, 4 December 2008 further referred to as 
“ECFI, PMOI II judgement”). The analysis is complemented with analysis relating to other relevant ECFI 
judgements, ECFI, Jose Maria Sison v. Council of the European Union, Judgement, Case No. T-47/03, 11 
July 2007 (further referred to as “ECFI, Sison judgement”); ECFI, Stichting Al-Aqsa v. Council of the 
European Union, Judgement, Case No. T-327/03, 11 July 2007, ECFI, Osman Ocalan on behalf of the 
Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) v. Council of the European Union, Judgement, Case No. T-299/02, 3 April 
2008, and ECFI, KONGRA-GEL v. Council of the European Union, Judgement, Case No. T-253/04, 4 april 
2008. 
69 As indicated by the ECFI in para. 89 of the OMPI judgement, those rights are closely linked. 
70 ECFI, OMPI judgement, paras. 99-107. 
71 ECFI, Sison judgement, para. 135. 
72 ECFI, OMPI judgement, para. 143. 
73 ECFI, OMPI judgement, para. 144, jo. 116, 125 and 126.  
74 Given that this was a procedural rather than a substantive fault, it could quite easily be remedied so that 
the applicants remained on the list. This results in new applications, such as in the case of Sison, ECFI, 
Jose Maria Sison v. Council of the European Union, Application, Case No. T-341/07, 10 September 2007. 
75 ECFI, OMPI judgement, para. 145-146. It might be argued that this position is incoherent with the 
binding obligation under article 1 (c) of Resolution 1373, which uses the wording “shall”. 
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As it emphasised, 
 
“Because the Community Courts may not, in particular, substitute their assessment of the 
evidence, facts and circumstances justifying the adoption of such measures for that of the 
Council, the review carried out by the Court of the lawfulness of decisions to freeze funds 
must be restricted to checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons 
have been complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, and that there has been no 
manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power. That limited review applies, 
especially, to the Council’s assessment of the factors as to appropriateness on which such 
decisions are based.”76
 
Hence, the ECFI was reluctant to engage in a full substantive review as to whether the 
evidence in the file supported the listing. In fact, in relation to the right to a fair hearing, 
the ECFI held that this right “must be effectively safeguarded in the first place as part of 
the national procedure which led to the adoption, by the competent national authority, of 
the decision referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931.”77 The ECFI held 
it would be inappropriate for the Court to review whether the national decision was based 
on “serious and credible evidence or clues,”78 and deferred as far as possible to the 
assessment conducted by the competent national authority.79 The right to a fair hearing at 
Community level would only apply to newly adduced evidence, i.e. information or 
evidence adduced by Member States which had not been assessed by a competent 
national authority.80
 
In the specific case of OMPI, the decision was first annulled because the applicant had 
not been informed of the national decision on which the contested decision had been 
based.81 This failure was subsequently remedied by the Council which maintained OMPI 
on its list. The applicant was informed that the relevant national decision was an order of 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the United Kingdom of 29 March 
2001 proscribing OMPI as a terrorist organization on the basis of the UK Terrorism Act 
2000. However, on 30 November 2007, the Proscribed Organisations Appeal 
Commission (POAC)82 ordered the Home Secretary to present to the UK Parliament the 
draft of an Order removing the applicant.83 The Home Secretary’s application for leave to 
appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 7 May 2008.  
                                                 
76 ECFI, OMPI judgement, para. 159. 
77 ECFI, OMPI judgement, para. 119. 
78 ECFI, OMPI judgement, para. 122. 
79 ECFI, OMPI judgement, para. 124. 
80 ECFI, OMPI judgement, para. 125. 
81 ECFI, OMPI judgement, paras. 160-174. 
82 POAC is a special commission established by the Terrorism Act 2000, precisely to deal with these kind 
of appeals. Before the POAC special procedures are in place to deal with information that the Home 
Secretary wishes not to disclose for reasons of national security or public interest, The Proscribed 
Organisations Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2007 No. 1286. 
83 POAC, Lord Alton of Liverpool and others in the matter of The People’s Mojahadeen Organisation of 
Iran and Secretary of State for the Home Department, Judgement, Appeal No. PC/02/2006, 30 November 
2007 (further referred to as “POAC, Mojahadeen judgement”). After intense scrutiny of all the information 
that was or could have been available to the Secretary of State (para. 347), the POAC came to the 
conclusion that “the only belief that a reasonable decision maker could have honestly entertained, whether 
as at September 2006 or thereafter, is that the PMOI no longer satisfies any of the criteria necessary for the 
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Yet, at EU level, OMPI remained on the list. In the PMOI I judgement, the ECFI declared 
the decision to keep the organization on the list after the POAC decision as unlawful, as 
the Council had not provided proper and sufficient reasons for its decision to continue the 
freezing.84 In particular, the ECFI recalled the considerable importance of national 
decisions in this context and the obligation to defer as much as possible to national 
assessments.85
 
With this reasoning, the ECFI left the substantive review of files largely to national 
systems, which have special procedures in place to deal with classified information. In its 
first OMPI judgement, the ECFI left the question open as to whether in the context of the 
right to effective judicial protection, confidential information had to be shared with the 
applicant or whether it could be provided only to the Court so as to safeguard public 
interests.86  
 
In its third judgement, PMOI II, the ECFI elaborated on the issue of classified 
information. This judgement concerned the contested continued listing of the 
organisation, not any longer on the basis of the POAC decision, but instead on the basis 
of decisions of a French prosecutor to open investigations against alleged members of the 
organisation.87 The decisions dated back to April 2001 and were complemented by 
charges brought in 2007. The question that the ECFI had to answer was whether these 
decisions qualified as a decision of a national authority as required by Article 1(4) of 
Common Position 2001/931. The ECFI could not answer this question as it did not have 
access to the complete file. Three documents that supported the listing and that France 
had circulated in the Council could not be provided to the ECFI as they were classified as 
confidential by France.88 The ECFI did not accept this and held,  
 
“As regards the Council’s contention that it is bound by the French authorities’ claim for 
confidentiality, this does not explain why the production of the relevant information or 
material in the file to the Court would violate the principle of confidentiality, whereas their 
production to the members of the Council, and thus to the governments of the 26 other 
Member States, did not.”89
 
                                                                                                                                                 
maintenance of their proscription.” (para. 349) Subsequently, the POAC ordered the Home Secretary to 
initiate the procedure to de-proscribe PMOI (para. 362). In addition, the POAC characterised the refusal to 
de-proscribe as “perverse”, while recognising that such a qualification was uncommon (para. 360). 
84 ECFI, PMOI I judgement, paras. 167-185. 
85 ECFI PMOI I judgement, para. 170 jo. 130-139. 
86 ECFI, OMPI judgement, para. 158. 
87 The ECFI observed that a literal reading of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 required a 
decision taken in respect of the person concerned, and that a decision against alleged members of an 
organisation rather than the organisation itself was inconsistent with that requirement, ECFI, PMOI II 
judgement, para. 64. 
88 In the case of Sison, intelligence information had also played a role in the decision to list, according to 
the designating state, the Netherlands. This information had not been made public and was not even kept by 
the Council, and was not transmitted to the Court, ECFI, Sison judgement, paras. 222-223.  
89 ECFI, PMOI II judgement, para. 72. 
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It continued, 
 
“the Council is not entitled to base its funds-freezing decision on information or material in 
the file communicated by a Member State, if the said Member State is not willing to authorise 
its communication to the Community judicature whose task is to review the lawfulness of that 
decision.”90
 
A significant difference between the 1267 UN listing procedure and the 1373 EU listing 
procedure is that in the latter procedure, listing hinges upon the existence of a national 
decision that a person has been or is suspected to have been involved in terrorism. In this 
context, the ECFI could defer to some extent to the legal protection offered in the 
procedure leading to the national decision. In the context of the 1267 listing, there is no 
requirement that listing be done on the basis of national (judicial) decisions, but can also 
be done purely on the basis of intelligence information. Such relative deference to 
national legal procedures can thus not take place in precisely the same manner, but may 
still be feasible in an adapted fashion. In the next section, the potential of national courts 
is explored in some more detail. 
 
3. Recent domestic cases and other developments 
At the domestic level, challenges have also been made against freezing measures in the 
context of UN counter-terrorism strategies. For instance in Switzerland, which is not a 
member of the EU, the implementation of the 1267 sanctions was challenged. The Swiss 
judgements in the cases of Nada Ebada and Himmat were rendered after the ECFI 
judgement in Kadi and Al Barakaat, but before the ECJ judgement in these cases. It is 
notable that the Swiss courts followed the ECFI judgement very closely, even though 
there was direct obligation to do so.91 In a recent Canadian challenge to implemented 
1267 sanctions that focused on the travel ban rather than the assets freeze, the Federal 
Court expressed severe criticism to the regime comparing the situation of the complainant 
to Josef K in Kafka’s The Trial.92 More generally, it is noteworthy that several States 
with a monist tradition in their reception of international law, are reconsidering the 
openness of their legal system in direct response to the perceived illegitimacy of the 1267 
sanctions regime. In Switzerland, the Ständerat (First Chamber) has instructed the 
government to inform the Security Council that it will not apply the sanctions anymore as 
of 2010 to natural persons (i) that are on the list for more than 3 years and who have not 
been brought before court, (ii) if these persons have not had the possibility to resort to an 
independent institution for a remedy, (iii) if no indictment against these persons have 
been issued, and (iv) if there has been no new incriminating evidence brought forward 
against these persons since their listing. This instruction still has to pass the Nationalrat 
                                                 
90 ECFI, PMOI II judgement, para. 73. 
91 Decision of the Federal Tribunal in Lausanne, Case 1A.48/2007, 22 April 2008, and Decision of the 
Federal Tribunal in Lausanne, Case 1A.45/2007, 14 November 2007, available on the website of the 
Federal Tribunal at www.bger.ch/fr/index/jurisdiction/jurisdiction-inherittemplate/jurisdiction-
recht/jurisdiction-recht-urteile2000.htm. Nada Ebada and Himmat were delisted on 10 August 2009 and 23 
September 2009 respectively. 
92 Federal Court, Abousfian Abdelrazik and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General of 
Canada, 2009 FC 580, 4 June 2009, paras. 45-54. 
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(Second Chamber) before it becomes binding on the Swiss government.93 In the 
Netherlands a Commission of State has been installed on 8 July 2009 to advise the 
Government on the need to amend the Dutch Constitution on a number of issues, 
including the influence of the international legal order on the Dutch legal order, Stcrt. 
10354, 9 July 2009. In the process leading up to the installation of the Commission, the 
Council of State explicitly referred to the 1267 regime as an example of international 
rules that were drafted outside a proper rule of law context.94  
 
Two concrete cases of interest are ongoing in the United Kingdom, namely the case of A, 
K, M, Q and G and H.M. Treasury, in which the Court of Appeal rendered judgement on 
30 October 200895 and Hay and H.M. Treasury of 10 July 2009.96 In the case of A, K, M, 
Q and G, the Court of Appeal was called upon to decide on the legality of two UK orders 
implementing Security Council 1373 and 1267, respectively. Of particular interest is the 
case against G, who was designated on the basis of apparently the same evidence under 
both the Order implementing Resolution 1373 (Terrorism Order, or TO) as well as the 
Order implementing Resolution 1267 (Al Qaeda Order, or AQO). In the context of TO 
where the designation of G had been done at UK level, the Court of Appeal held in its 
judgement, that appropriate procedures could and should be put in place to enable a 
proper review of the listing and to safeguard the interests of listed individuals. In the 
context of AQO, such review was more complicated as the designation had been done at 
the level of the Sanctions Committee, and the 1267 list was subsequently reproduced in 
the AQO. Therefore, it was argued by the State that a challenge to AQO was in reality a 
challenge to the listing by the 1267 Committee. An intricate factor to this legal panorama 
was that it had been the UK which had initially proposed G’s name for listing to the 1267 
Sanctions Committee. In this context, the Court of Appeal found it hard to accept that G 
would not have any possibility to have the underlying case against him reviewed. This 
was even more so, given that the Court had just argued that proper review should be in 
place under the TO. As G had been listed under the TO and the AQO on apparently the 
same evidence, the Court argued that also in the context of AQO a designated person 
should so far as possible be enabled to know the case against him and to challenge it on 
the merits. If in such a procedure, the Court would come to the conclusion that the listing 
was not justified, this would not mean that the AQO was unlawful, but it would rather 
impose a duty on the Government to support delisting. In the case of G, the line of 
reasoning of the Court and its own empowerment to review the basis of the listing was 
possible given that it was the UK that had proposed the listing to the 1267 Sanctions 
Committee. The evidence against G was thus in the hands of the UK government.97 
However, as the Court conceded,  
 
                                                 
93 See: www.parlament.ch/D/Suche/Seiten/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20093719. 
94 Advice Council of State, 14 April 2008, Parliamentory Records II 2007/08, 31 570, nr 3,  para. 4.2.3. 
95 Court of Appeal, A, K, M, Q & G and H.M. Treasury, Judgement, Case No. T1/2008/1080, 30 October 
2008 (further referred to as “Court of Appeal, A, K, M, Q & G judgement”). 
96 High Court of Justice (Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court), Hay and H.M. Treasury and 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Case No. CO/1200/2009, 10 July 2009 (further 
referred to as “High Court of Justice, Hay judgement”). 
97 Court of Appeal, A, K, M, Q & G judgement, paras. 107-121. 
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“There may be greater difficulties in a case where HMT knows nothing of the facts upon 
which the designation was made by the Committee. I would leave the possible problems in 
such a case to be solved when they arise. Here there is no such problem because HMT knows 
all the facts relevant to the TO and must know either all or most of the facts which led to G’s 
designation by the Committee.”98
 
This observation alludes to the identified challenge of intelligence-sharing. Moreover, the 
case against G, and the quoted observation of the Court in particular, underline that it is 
important to know which State has proposed the listing. Generally, it is in that State 
where the most comprehensive file will exist. If legal protection would be sought in that 
State, the problem of intelligence sharing would not necessarily arise and normally 
special procedures may  be in place to enable the applicant to have access to the file 
against him, or in any event to have the file against him being reviewed by an 
independent organ.  
 
The later case of Hay can be distinguished from the case of G as in the Hay case the UK 
was not the designating State. The identity of the nominating State was not revealed to 
Hay, but the UK did try to have information disclosed by the nominating State or the 
1267 Committee. These efforts failed.99 By lack of information on all the facts that had 
led to designation, the Court was precluded from undertaking a merits based review. The 
Court held that the United Nations Act on which the AQO was based did not expressly or 
implicitly empower the Executive to remove the right to access to court.100 Therefore, the 
AQO was quashed insofar as it concerned Hay as being ultra vires. The Court did note 
that enabling legislation by Parliament could remedy the situation and ensure compliance 
with UN resolutions.101
 
4. The UN Human Rights Committee: Sayadi and Vinck 
The UN Human Rights Committee, the supervisory body of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), was confronted with a claim related to the 1267 
sanctions regime in the case of Sayadi and his wife Vinck versus Belgium. Sayadi and 
Vinck, two Belgian nationals, were placed on the 1267 list in early 2003 at the initiative 
of Belgium.102 Around the same time domestic criminal investigations were initiated 
against them.103 The reasons for the listing were the involvement of Sayadi and Vinck in 
the European branch of an organization that had been placed on the 1267 list. Pursuant to 
domestic efforts by Sayadi and Vinck to be delisted, the Brussels Court of First Instance 
ordered the Belgian State on 11 February 2005 to initiate the delisting procedure. In 
compliance, the Belgian State submitted a request to that effect to the Sanctions 
Committee on 25 February 2005, but this request was blocked by several members of the 
                                                 
98 Court of Appeal, A, K, M, Q & G judgement, para. 120. 
99 High Court of Justice, Hay judgement, para. 30. 
100 High Court of Justice, Hay judgement, para. 40. 
101 High Court of Justice, Hay judgement, para. 46. 
102 Even though it is generally not known which State is the designating State, Belgium admitted to have 
initiated these particular listing in the HRC proceedings, HRC, Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck v. Belgium, 
View, Communication No. 1472/2006, 29 December 2008, para. 4.2. Sayadi and Vinck were delisted on 20 
July 2009. 
103 HRC, Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck v. Belgium, View, Communication No. 1472/2006, 29 December 
2008, paras. 2.1-2.3. 
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Sanctions Committee.104 It should be noted that the Sanctions Committee decides by 
consensus only. In April 2006, Belgium reiterated its request after the criminal case had 
been formally terminated in Belgium.105 Again, the request did not result in delisting. On 
14 March 2006, Sayadi and Vinck submitted their communication to the Human Rights 
Committee. They argued that with its proposal to list the claimants without “relevant 
information” and through the subsequent imposition of sanctions, Belgium had violated 
several provisions of the ICCPR, including procedural provisions on fair trial and 
effective remedy (articles 2 and 14) as well as the right to free movement (article 12). 
 
Belgium firstly argued that the case was inadmissible as it concerned measures taken to 
implement Charter obligations and the claimants thus did not fall within the jurisdiction 
of the State as required by Article 1 of the Optional Protocol. According to Belgium, the 
claims submitted “wrongly implie[d] that the Committee can pass judgement on the 
validity of Security Council Resolutions.”106 Referring to Article 103 of the UN Charter, 
Belgium further submitted that it could “not be held responsible for failure to respect a 
lower-ranking obligation that runs counter to the Charter.”107 More specifically, Belgium 
argued that the obligation under Resolution 1267 to “cooperate fully” with the Sanctions 
Committee had obliged it to furnish the Committee with the names of Sayadi and Vinck, 
since they were the director and secretary respectively of a listed entity. Furthermore, 
Belgium argued that it had done everything in its power to delist the two at a later stage, 
and that it could not be held responsible for the failure to succeed, as other members of 
the Sanctions Committee had blocked the delisting request.108
 
The Committee did not agree with these arguments. In a similar approach as the ECJ, it 
tried to distinguish between the Security Council resolution and specific actions of the 
State and held, 
 
“While the Committee could not consider alleged violations of other instruments such as the 
Charter of the United Nations, or allegations that challenged United Nations rules concerning 
the fight against terrorism, the Committee was competent to admit a communication alleging 
that a State party had violated rights set forth in the Covenant, regardless of the source of the 
obligation implemented by the State party.”109
 
In its assessment as to whether the travel ban that had been effectively imposed as a result 
of the listing violated the freedom of movement, the Committee even went one step 
further and saw it as,  
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2008, paras. 2.5 and 4.3. 
105 HRC, Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck v. Belgium, View, Communication No. 1472/2006, 29 December 
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106 HRC, Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck v. Belgium, View, Communication No. 1472/2006, 29 December 
2008, para. 6.1. 
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“the duty of the Committee, as guarantor of the rights protected by the Covenant, to consider 
to what extent the obligations imposed on the State party by the Security Council resolutions 
may justify the infringement of the right to liberty of movement, which is protected by article 
12 of the Covenant.”110
 
As indicated by Committee Member Shearer in a dissenting opinion, with this reasoning 
the Committee “appears to regard the Covenant as on a par with the United Nations 
Charter, and not as subordinate to it.”111  
 
In several individual opinions appended to the view of the Committee, Committee 
Members disagreed on the question of admissibility and emphasised that the decision to 
list was taken by the Sanctions Committee and not by Belgium. Moreover, they stressed 
the priority of Security Council resolutions and the impossibility that the Committee 
would review such resolutions.112
 
The Committee, in its majority deciding otherwise, held Belgium responsible for the 
violation of the right to free movement and the right to respect for privacy since Belgium 
had initially proposed the listing. The Committee found Belgium’s defence that it was 
under an obligation to do so unconvincing given that other States had not done so 
either.113 In relation to the travel ban specifically, the Committee held that Belgium had 
violated the freedom of movement. The Committee maintained that the fact that Belgium 
had submitted the delisting requests indicated that the restrictions imposed on Sayadi’s 
freedom of movement had not been necessary to protect national security or public 
order.114
 
Concluding remarks 
On the basis of the analysis above, it is apparent that at various levels and by various 
courts and other semi-legal bodies, UN sanctions regimes are under scrutiny -- not only 
by regional and domestic courts, but also by a UN organ, the Human Rights Committee. 
Moreover, national parliaments and legislators perceive UN targeted sanctions as lacking 
in legitimacy and coherence with domestic standards of the rule of law. Overall, the 
special and primordial position of the Security Council is formally respected by regional 
and national courts and the HRC. However, in light of the absence of any form of 
independent review at the level of the Security Council, all these bodies perceive a 
pressing need to act. It is reasonable to expect that more regional and domestic courts will 
follow the lead taken by the ECJ, and will offer targeted individuals some kind of redress. 
The persistent challenges to the targeted sanctions regime may well undermine their 
efficacy and legitimacy and, in the long run, the credibility of the Security Council.  
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